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Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Letter dated 29 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), entitled "Solidarity of peoples for peace and security, strengthened sovereignty and the prevention of interference in the internal affairs of other States", adopted at the Tenth Congress of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, held in Rabat, Morocco, on 20 October 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31.

(*Signed*) V. **Churkin**

16-21590 (E) 131216 131216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 29 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), entitled "Solidarity of peoples for peace and security, strengthened sovereignty and the prevention of interference in the internal affairs of other States"

We, the representatives of the national committees of Afro-Asian peoples' solidarity, gathered at the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Tenth Congress in Rabat, Morocco, note with great concern the growing negative developments in certain regions and throughout the world.

Challenges and threats are emerging that affect the vital interests of the countries and peoples of Asia and Africa.

This particularly applies to the sovereignty of African and Asian States and their rights to develop independently and determine their own development paths.

The achievement of independence by once-colonized and dependent Asian and African countries was one of the brightest and most positive events of the twentieth century.

Unfortunately, today we again see a real risk of losing those historic gains.

African and Asian States are facing attempts by some countries with more powerful militaries to issue diktats, even going so far as to include the threat or use of force.

An external intervention carried out in Iraq under a false pretext had grave repercussions, leading to the death of many thousands of people.

A violent foreign-backed coup in Libya plunged that country into a fratricidal war.

Militias representing international terrorist organizations operate today in Syria with broad external support. They have seized a large part of Syria, which has become a real threat to its territorial integrity and very existence as a State.

At the same time, the United States of America and other Western countries are conducting military operations in Syria without the consent of that country's legitimate Government.

We call on the United States of America and its allies in the international coalition to respect the sovereignty of independent Syria, which has been a member of the United Nations since 1945. We believe that the United States of America, pursuant to its commitments as a member of the Security Council, should concentrate its efforts on the real fight against terrorism — the main threat to peace and security in today's world.

We strongly condemn all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed, in all their forms and manifestations.

This situation requires the combined efforts of the international community and all those who are able and willing to raise their voices against the threat of war or encroachment on the sovereignty and independence of peoples.

We are convinced that the current extremely alarming developments make it necessary to more fully utilize the potential of the African and Asian countries' solidarity movement and to revitalize the work of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization.

The Organization's Tenth Congress calls for the launch of a broad international campaign in order to affirm the rights of all States, large and small, to independent development, State sovereignty and protection of their national interests.

We call on all civic organizations and national parliaments to influence the Governments of their countries to provide the fullest possible financial and material assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons from Syria and other countries of the region.

The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, an organization with consultative status in a number of United Nations specialized agencies, calls for a public forum to be held, under United Nations auspices, to develop a joint programme to counter the threat of terrorism, strengthen international security and prevent interference in the internal affairs of independent States.

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 68 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement delivered by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on draft resolution A/C.3/71/L.24, on the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, adopted on 15 November 2016 by the Third Committee (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 68 (c).

(*Signed*) Gholamhossein **Dehghani**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

16-21658 (E) 211216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on draft resolution A/C.3/71/L.24, on the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, adopted on 15 November 2016 by the Third Committee

Apart from the unfair and politically motivated approach adopted by the sponsors of the draft resolution on human rights in Syria, which is objectionable in its own right, draft resolution A/C.3/71/L.24 contains provisions that run counter to the basic principles of international law and steer the Third Committee away from its statutory course.

The content of paragraph 24 of the draft resolution sinisterly libels and condemns precisely those who are in Syria to fight against ISIS and the Al-Nusrah Front, newly dubbed Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and their affiliates. In doing so, the paragraph blurs the line between terrorists and those who heroically fight them back and creates confusion regarding United Nations designated terrorist groups. Two of the forces that are mentioned in paragraph 24 are part of the regular armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, deployed in Syria on an exclusively advisory basis at the formal invitation of the Government of that country, and who are resisting the terrorist onslaught in Syria.

The accusations levelled in the above-mentioned paragraph, apart from being totally baseless, have nothing to do with the mandate of the Third Committee nor are they compatible with the title of the draft resolution, which purports to deal with human rights in Syria. The incorporation of the accusations into this draft cannot amount to anything other than a kind of revenge against those who have so far been the most effective force on the ground against terrorism and violent extremism — a force that, if it were not for its genuine and resolute fight against terrorism, more of the Middle East would have by now fallen under the black flag of Daesh.

Who could believe that the main sponsors of the draft resolution, in particular Saudi Arabia, are concerned about human rights in Syria, while during the last one and a half years they were busy wreaking havoc in Yemen, turning it from deprivation to devastation through indiscriminate aerial bombing of civilian targets and residential areas, ironically claiming to be invited to do so.

The General Assembly and the Third Committee should not be exploited to meet the political goals of the countries whose main concerns are either losing their strategic grip on the region or losing the billions of dollars they have spent in nurturing terrorists in Syria and its neighbouring countries, as well as the destiny of thousands of their citizens that are fighting as foreign terrorist fighters against the Syrian people and Government.

Ultimately, the people of Syria will defeat the terrorists and their allies, the same allies that are sending encouraging messages to their vicious forces in Syria through abusing the Third Committee platform and the adoption of this absurd draft resolution, a draft resolution that is nothing but a reward to violent extremism and

terrorism and to those who have helped them through their extreme ideologies and corresponding financial and logistical resources in the past many years.

It is also peculiar that a number of countries in the West who claim the high ground in preaching to others about human rights have sided with those who, at the very least, have always been the source of exported intolerance to other parts of the world, the very intolerance that is, in turn, the major source of violent extremism and terrorism. Let alone what they do with their own citizens inside their borders. It is very unfortunate that, at the same time, the structural weakness of the United Nations human rights mechanisms is giving them the opportunity to abuse the system and have such resolutions passed.

Those who initiated this draft resolution shall rest assured that this and similar acts will not dissuade the Islamic Republic of Iran from its fight against violent extremism and its determination to fight extremists who try to sow terror in the neighbourhood and export it to the entire world.

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 51
Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations: strengthening the role of regional actors in conducting peace operations", which was drafted for the meeting of the United Nations Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 27 May 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fode **Seck**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21669 (E) 131216 141216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "Partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations: strengthening the role of regional actors in conducting peace operations" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

On 27 May 2016, Senegal, as Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, will hold a thematic discussion entitled ""Partnerships: strengthening the role of regional actors in conducting peace operations."

This discussion will bring together Security Council members and a broad range of Member States, particularly troop - and police-contributing countries. Mr. El-Ghassim WANE, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and Dr Donald Kaberuka, High Representative of African Union for the AU Peace Funds, Ambassador Macharia KAMAU, and Ambassador Loannis Vrailas Deputy Permanent Representative of the European Union delegation to the United Nations have been invited to brief the Working Group.

BACKGROUND

The United Nations are no longer the only actor in the field of the maintenance of peace and security. They share more responsibility for peacekeeping and security with regional Organizations. Indeed Regional and sub regional organizations are playing an important role in the collective peace and security architecture.

They are taking over greater responsibilities and are becoming more prominent features in the global peace and security landscape with the increase in number of peace operations led by regional actors.

This evolution stems from the awareness that regional actors offer comparative advantages by bringing a better understanding of co. ext, local implications, roots causes and driving forces of a conflict.

The particular interest of regional organizations in maintaining peace in their regions and their greater knowledge of the regional context lend more legitimacy and sensitivity to their interventions.

Moreover, they may be in a better position to react preventively by deploying troops more promptly and are often more willing to respond in complex security contexts.

In this context of the shifting nature of conflicts dynamic and the rapid evolving of unconventional threats to international peace and security, the demand for peacekeeping is growing and the strengthening of the partnerships with regional organizations, in accordance with chapter VIII of the Charter, appears to be an effective way to improve the collective response to these complex challenges. In this

regard, the UN-AU relationship is the foremost example of the implementation of the Chapter VIII provisions of the UN Charter.

In its presidential statement S/PRST/2014/27 ", the Security Council acknowledged the progress made in the ongoing cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, and stressed the importance of further strengthening cooperation and developing effective partnership with the African Union Peace and Security Council consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, to address common collective security challenges in Africa.

The need to enhance cooperation with regional and sub-regional organizations, in particular the African Union has been one of the core recommendations of ongoing review processes meant to make UN peace operations more effective. While the African Union has assumed more responsibilities in peace and security on the continent, it is nevertheless, is facing major challenges to reach its potential in this regard.

Therefore, there is a need to enhance the existing partnership between the UN and the AU, at both the strategic and operational levels, in order to ensure greater synergies and coherence and more effective response to evolving peace and security challenges facing the African continent.

The High level panel on UN peacekeeping operations stresses the need to mobilize comparative advantages of the United Nations and regional organizations in responding to emerging crises and calls for a bold new agenda to build a strong global-regional framework to meet those challenges through responsible and principled strategic partnerships.

The panel further stresses the importance for the Security Council to be able to rely upon a more resilient framework for swift and effective international response in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Recognizing that African Union and its sub regional partners, in particular, have become increasingly operational, the panel recommends also the intensification of the regional partnerships of the United Nations in Africa whether in preventing conflict or responding to it and invites the United Nations to take the decisive step to invest in and commit to the success of the African Union as a partner in addressing shared concerns. The panel further recommends more support to African Union peacekeeping operations approved by the Security Council and calls for more predictable funding, including the use of contributions of States.

The panel's call for enhancing the cooperation with the African Union is echoed by the Secretary General implementation's report S/2015/682 where he recognizes that the international peace and security responsibilities shouldered by the African Union and regional economic communities and regional mechanisms in Africa have grown enormously in recent years and they represent a significant human and financial

burden for African countries. He stresses also the need to look for ways to share that burden and commits himself to strengthening arrangements that enable effective delivery by the African Union for the collective benefit and, where United Nations peace operations deploy alongside or after African Union missions, to reinforcing the political and operational benefits of cooperation. The Secretary General concurred with the Panel's call for sustained, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support African Union peace support operations.

SCOPE AND PERSPECTIVES

As underlined in the Secretary general's report "Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping" Since the entry into force of the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in December 2003 the African Union and the regional economic communities/ regional mechanisms have been increasingly taking initiatives on peace and security, and their role in those areas has grown, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The partnership between the United Nations and the African Union has greatly evolved in 2007 with the establishment of annual joint consultative meetings between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Both organs have underlined their commitment to the development of a stronger and more structured relationship, through enhanced information-sharing, synergies in planning and monitoring, joint assessments and strategies to increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

In 2010 the UN and AU created the Joint Task Force (JTF) on peace and security. In 2010, a major step forward was taken with the creation of the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) by General Assembly resolution A/64/288 which endorsed the proposal contained in the Secretary General's report A/64/762. It was mandated to enhance the strategic and operational partnership between the two organizations in the area of peace and security, provide coordinated and coherent United Nations support to the African Union on both short-term operational and planning matters and long-term capacity-building, and provide a more coherent, cost-effective and efficient United Nations representation to the African Union. The Secretary General appointed an UN special representative to the AU at the level of under-secretary-general.

Several recommendations and measures were announced by the UN Secretary-General to strengthen the partnership with the African Union and in particular of African capacities in the area of peacekeeping:

1 - the completion in 2016 of the UN-African Union joint framework for a stronger partnership for peace and security, which will provide a blueprint for the two organizations to act quickly and without interruption before, during and after conflicts and supporting research for political solutions to crises;

2- the support of the SG / UN recommendation by the independent High Level Group on Peace Operations for the establishment of mechanisms to provide a stable, predictable and flexible to Peace Support Operations AU. A joint evaluation of the financing mechanisms and support of the AU will soon be undertaken;

3- Institutionalization of frameworks for dialogue and cooperation between the AU and the United Nations (consultative processes and joint mechanisms);
4- Creation of two regional offices, one in North Africa and one in Southern Africa;
5- Contribution to the UN in the pre-deployment training;
6- Definition of a common vision of the transitioning benchmarks that will guide transfer to the United Nations management of AU operations, lessons-learned exercises from experiences gained in Mali (MINUSMA), CAR (MINUSCA) and Somalia (AMISOM)
8- The idea of the SG / UN to explore with the AU and the EU, the option to use once it is fully operational, the African Standby Force, to serve as a transition force pending the mobilization and deployment of a UN mission.

In the field of peacekeeping, several models of partnerships have been developed between the UN and the AU. Since 2002, planned transitions from African Union to UN peace operations have taken place in Burundi, Mali and Central African Republic. The African Union Mission in Sudan transitioned into the hybrid AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2008. In 2009 was established the UN's support Office to the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA).

CHALLENGES

Challenges are numerous but the major and critical obstacle in this area is the lack of flexible, sustainable and predictable funding, as well as oversight and accountability mechanisms.

In the S/PRST/2014/27 "The Security Council recognizes that one major constraint facing the African Union, in effectively carrying out the mandates of maintaining regional peace and security is securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources.
This issue is considered so important that in 2008, it prompted the Secretary-General to establish an African Union-United Nations panel in charge of considering the modalities of how to support — including financially — African Union peace operations established under a United Nations mandate. The Security Council has been seized of this issue on several occasions since then. How the African Union-led peacekeeping initiatives are financed According to the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002), member States of the African organization deploying personnel in African Union peace operations bear the cost of their participation during the first three months and the organization commits to reimburse those States within a period of six months, then proceeding to finance the operation. The African Union established a Peace Fund to provide the necessary financial resources for its peace operations: such a fund is made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the African Union, voluntary contributions from member States and other sources within Africa (private sector, civil society and individuals), and through appropriate fundraising activities.

However, for a number of reasons, some of them political, never before January 2013 with the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali

(AFISMA) was the African Union in a position to make available some of its own funds for a peace operation. Indeed, the African Union has been almost entirely dependent on exceptional measures and on external sources of funding for its peacekeeping initiatives. Apart from its own Peace Fund, the African Union currently depends on four different sources of money to deploy peace operations: the African Peace Facility, financed through the European Development Fund; multi-donor trust funds; bilateral financial support to troop- and police-contributing countries; and United Nations assessed contributions. As an example, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is financed by bilateral donations and voluntary contributions either to a United Nations managed Trust Fund or to troop- and police-contributing countries directly. Moreover, the European Union provides the resources for the payment of troop allowances and other related expenses, within the framework of the African Peace Facility. However, E.U has decided to reduce, by 20 per cent of its funding to AMISOM troop allowances. Lastly, AMISOM benefits from a United Nations logistical support package dispensed through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA).

The lack of flexible, sustainable and predictable funding engenders acute problems that prevent the African Union from playing the role it should have in the field of peacekeeping.

So as it is clearly underlined in the Common African position on the review of peace operations, the financing of African-led peace operations in a flexible, predictable and sustainable manner remains one of the most important strategic challenges facing the AU and UN, and more needs to be done to address this challenge directly. African peace operations represent local responses to global problems and effective African peace operations thus represent a significant contribution to the global common good. Moreover, Africa has become the largest single contributor to UN peace operations, contributing approximately 45 % of the UN's uniformed peacekeepers.

To date, there are three ways in which the UN has supported AU operations in the past: through undertaking hybrid missions where the AU retains a political role in the management of the mission, but where the financial costs are fully funded by the UN through the normal process of assessed contributions (e.g. UNAMID); through deploying a UN support mission to indirectly support key elements, including logistics, of an AU mission (e.g. UNSOA), and by the UNSC authorizing a UN Trust Fund that is dependent on voluntary contributions but that has the political backing of the UNSC. The AU- UN joint review was expected to be launched this month this process should lead to recommendations regarding how the financing mechanisms can be improved and adapted in the future

The AU is committed to increase the proportion of the cost of AU peace operations covered by the AU and its Member States.

The recent appointment of an African Union High level representative of the African Union Peace Fund is a strong signal to the International community on the union's commitment towards finding sustainable, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support AU-led peace operations. In addition, the African Union aims at financing 25 per cent of its peace support operations expenditures by 2020 through its own budget and also to seek alternative ways to finance the AU and its peace operations.

OBJECTIVE

In the light of ongoing process in assessing the mechanisms of financing and supporting African union peace operations, and considering the ongoing efforts from the AU, this thematic discussion gives and opportunities to take of stock ongoing efforts and initiatives to assess current funding practices and mechanisms of AU-led peace operations with a view to stirring debate on the question of financing of peace missions in Africa.

Key questions for considerations:

What models of predictable mechanisms can be developed for addressing the financing of AU peace operations in future?

What experience could be drawn from the mechanism of Trust Funds in terms of reliability, predictability and accessibility?

What is the appropriate consultative decision-making framework, division of labor and burden-sharing that should be put in place, and how would this impact on peace operations, as undertaken by both the UN and the AU?

- How relations between the United Nations and the African Union in the area of peace and security could be better viewed as a strategic partnership, based on a division of labor and burden sharing?

- How can the UN better support the AU-led missions that are authorized by the UNSC?

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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Protection of civilians and political strategies", which was drafted for the meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 3 November 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-21967 (E) 131216 131216

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "Protection of civilians and political strategies" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

Background

For over fifteen years, the protection of civilians (POC) has been a peacekeeping priority, where today over 95 per cent of UN peacekeepers are mandated to protect civilians. Although the protection of civilians is primarily the responsibility of States, the United Nations has an essential part to play, through peacekeeping operations in particular. Given the complex operating environments into which missions deploy today, protecting civilians require a collective commitment by Member States, peacekeeping operations and others.

Since the late 1990s, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat have developed institutional and operational tools to strengthen UN action in this regard, as illustrated by Security Council resolutions 1265 (1999), 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009), the reports of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and the 2015 DPKO-DFS policy on the protection of civilians. However, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), while highlighting the significant progress made in concepts and standards on protecting civilians, noted that political solutions must take a more central role in mission strategies, and that decisive leadership remained essential to the protection of civilians mandate.

How and why are the protection of civilians and political strategies linked?

Peacekeeping is a fundamentally political tool. The military activities of peacekeepers, while important, are only steps to achieve a political goal. In years past, the primary political goal of peacekeeping operations was often the consolidation of an already agreed peace. In more recent years, peacekeeping missions have increasingly been deployed to help bring parties together and shape a sustainable peace. In such contexts, where conflict may be on-going, civilian lives are at risk and peacekeepers are often called upon to protect them. At the same time, without a viable strategy to resolve the armed conflict that poses threats to civilians in the first place, efforts to protect could end up being protracted and unsustainable.

Protecting civilians is ultimately the responsibility of the host state. Peacekeeping operations frequently have multiple roles in supporting this responsibility. Missions perform the essential task of strengthening state institutions for protection, including police, defence and justice. At the same time, particularly when conflict is ongoing, the capacity and the will by the government to protect its own citizens may not always be present. In such cases, peacekeepers provide protection to civilians under threat and a sense of safety for the population. Navigating these roles require political strategies based on solid assessments and analysis.

Effective linkages between protection of civilian efforts to political strategies can lead to successful prevention. The concerted international engagement in the early phases of the UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is an illustrative example. In a country with a weak national army and deep religious and ethnic divisions, peacekeepers stabilized key areas of the country, including the capital Bangui and hotspots in the centre of the country.

Between 2014 and 2015, strong political engagement and mediation at the international, regional, and national levels, paired with responses of all civilian and uniformed actors on the ground, enabled a visible countrywide deployment at the community levels. The mission made a concerted effort at harmonizing engagement with international actors in CAR, and such consultative strategies allowed stronger action, which helped prevent widespread bloodshed.

Although many challenges remain in CAR, this experience shows us how coordinated political engagement and sustained dialogue with all partners, from the local to the international stage, can lead to effective protection.

It shows particularly the importance of working with regional and sub-regional actors when they are playing a constructive role in promoting political solutions.

Challenges

The overarching challenge of protection is political. This can be articulated at a number of levels: first, devising political strategies to resolve conflict around which the Security Council, troop and police contributors, and the Secretariat may rally around. Second, addressing the political will of host authorities in the protection of their own citizens, and third, ensuring that the political commitment exists from key stakeholders – in particular troop and police contributors -- to fulfil sometime dangerous and risky POC tasks.

1. POC and political engagement

The High Level Panel on Peace Operations warned against using the peacekeeping principles as a shield for inaction. One could also posit that POC should not be used as a shield for political inaction. Across a number of theatres, peacekeepers have been mandated to protect civilians amidst ongoing conflict, absent a viable political process. In such instances, there is a humanitarian imperative to protect, but peacekeepers cannot replace efforts to resolve conflict, which require sustained political engagement, creativity and partnership-building. Protection mandates are frequently framed in highly operational, even tactical, terms, despite the strategic nature of Council resolutions. High-visibility peacekeeping deployments risk eclipsing the difficult work of pursuing political solutions, shifting the onus of the international community's engagement in a war-torn country away from the Security Council's responsibilities, to the performance of peacekeepers.

Solutions to close the gap require unity in the Council, through enhanced coordination and dialogue between Council members. By clarifying how the Council views the mission's

protection activities as contributing to a context-specific political process, peacekeepers will have a far greater understanding of their role and will execute it more effectively. To feed the discussion, the Secretariat has a duty to formulate clear recommendations on the course of action, based on solid analysis of the threats and context, allowing the Council to formulate, prioritize, and sequence mandated tasks. The Secretariat is currently working on a number of initiatives in this regard, including strengthening methodologies relating to the information management cycle, and capacities for situational awareness and threat analysis. In particular, the Secretariat is in the process of developing a policy that will provide a framework for effective, efficient and responsible information gathering and analysis across all mission components, allowing a better understanding of dynamics within the area of operation as well as real early warning of specific threats. Such efforts will help better identify and anticipate threats and plan accordingly, which provide a clearer vision to ensure T/PCCs are on board with the proposed modus operandi.

2. POC and the host state

Host governments have the primary responsibility to protect civilians. But this role may not be fulfilled, either because the government lacks the will – as is the case in South Sudan or Syria – or the government lacks the capacity – as is the case in CAR or Mali. Where host governments are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, and a peacekeeping operation has a POC mandate, the mission has the responsibility to intervene to protect civilians. This can give rise to situations when the peacekeepers may have to use force against their hosts, the very authorities that consented to their deployment.

In cases where there is a lack of will, increased dialogue with the host government is critical to protect civilians, while simultaneously leveraging influential parties to address the lack of will. The use of sanctions and compacts could also be considered. In cases where there is a lack of capacity, the peacekeeping operation should focus on the provision of logistical support and capacity-building efforts for the national security and corrections entities, through training and joint operations, based on the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) to maintain the legitimacy and credibility of the United Nations.

3. POC and T/PCC ownership

Political commitment by T/PCCs to carry out the mandate is vital to ensure that the mission performs to the standard expected by the Security Council. Equally, there is a need to ensure that, in each specific instance, there is consensus on what is being asked of troops and police and what is expected of them, particularly with regard to the use of force. In South Sudan, peacekeepers have been criticised for inaction in not confronting a government army equipped with mortars, tanks and attack helicopters. As electoral violence flares up in some countries, we are potentially facing scenarios in which Missions are expected to protect civilians from government forces. In such situations, T/PCCs and the Security Council must have a clear vision of the extent to which the peacekeeping operation is capable and willing to implement its mandate[1].

[1] A range of tools support collective and coordinated action in these complex environments, such as the Rules of Engagement (RoE) and Directives on the Use of Force (DUF), Concepts of Operations (ConOps), UN

Dialogue among Security Council, T/PCCs and Secretariat

While all of these efforts contribute to improving the effective implementation of the POC mandate, the political dialogue precludes any agreement on engagement. The Secretary-General in his report (A/70/357-S/2015/682) underscored that sustained dialogue among the Security Council, T/PCCs and Secretariat is essential, including prior to the establishment of a mission. The Secretary-General advanced options for strengthening this dialogue, including Secretariat and Security Council briefings to potential contributors on its conflict assessment before an operation is authorized. Such briefings would allow potential contributors to consider capability requirements and give the Council an opportunity to gather views on challenges and opportunities on potential mandated tasks. They could also allow opportunity to share viewa on the question of assessment of threats driving capability requirements and planning.

While various consultation formats exist, there appear to be limited opportunities for a meaningful discussion between the Security Council, T/PCCs, the Secretariat and the host State. Such discussions are critical, given the political challenges described above, and the need for clearer consensus around expectations and the will to protect civilians. The Security Council Working Group (SCWG) has held meetings on cross-cutting and mission-specific thematic issues, to which T/PCCs are frequently invited, providing a useful forum for discussion. These discussions could be further advanced through informal mechanisms to allow substantive discussions. Through such dialogue, T/PCCs would gain well-rounded views of POC mandates and challenges, as well as on the ROE and DUF prior to deployment.

The protection of civilians is more than a temporary answer to physical violence; therefore it requires more than a temporary military solution. Effective protection requires a political process that can lead to the creation of a protective environment for sustainable peace.

Challenges and Discussion Questions

1. How can the Security Council better reflect the effective linkages between political strategies and POC? How could this be reflected in mandate language?
2. What are the expectations of the host state, particularly in cases where they pose a threat to civilians? What are the Council's expectations towards peacekeepers in such cases?
3. How can the Council, T/PCCs and Secretariat conduct effective dialogue regarding challenges to implementing POC mandates?
4. How can the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat ensure an inclusive and substantive exchange on the relationship between threat assessment, conflict analysis and dialogue for new and existing mandates?
5. How can the Security Council and T/PCCs better manage expectations for peacekeeping?

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command and control arrangements (C2), highlighting responsibilities and clarifying the relationship between military operations and political engagement in the mission. The Operational Readiness Assurance (ORA) policy supports the respective responsibilities between troop contributors, Secretariat and field missions, allowing a clear approach to evaluating performance of uniformed components, which should strengthen dialogue with T/PCCs. The Secretariat will continue to pursue efforts to better mainstream POC in mission planning processes and documents and improve training on POC at all levels (pre-deployment and in-mission).

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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Peacekeeping operations, terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, opportunities and implications", which was drafted for the meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 24 June 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "United Nations peacekeeping, terrorism and violent extremism: challenges, opportunities and implications" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

Background

Senegal, as chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, will hold a thematic discussion to consider the challenges, opportunities and implications of terrorism and violent extremism for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. The discussion will bring together Security Council members and a broad range of Member States.

Terrorism and violent extremism as emerging issues for UN peacekeeping

Over the past two decades, the security environments of UN peace operations have become significantly more complex. Peacekeepers are today deployed in volatile and non-permissive contexts, often in the absence of an established peace agreement or, on occasion, without a political process underway. In many of these environments, a diverse range of state and non-state armed groups operate, many of which employ terrorism (asymmetric violence), including targeting of civilians and/or the UN to further their goals. The use of asymmetric and terrorist tactics by parties to conflict raises challenges for the safety and security of UN personnel and for the delivery of mandated tasks by UN peacekeepers. Over the past decade, the Security Council, the Secretariat and Member States have sought to enhance the mandate and capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations to negotiate the increased threats of asymmetric violence, in particular in contexts of protection of civilians' mandates.

More recent attention has focused on violent extremism as a subset of asymmetric violence. Part of the challenge in addressing this topic is that there is no shared definition of violent extremism in policy or intergovernmental circles, and groups that are often said to espouse violent extremism differ widely in their location, composition and tactics.[1] Nevertheless, violent extremism could be described as a commitment to violent means (i.e., terrorism) in order to attain goals that are incompatible with the international state system, an adherence to transnational violent ideologies and *a priori* rejection of negotiated political settlements. These features, particularly when combined with a justification of the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians and rejection of international humanitarian and human rights norms and standards, pose significant challenges for all areas of the UN work. The prevalence and growth in manifestations of violent extremism in areas of existing conflict,[2] however, pose particular challenges for the UN peace and security frameworks and instruments, of which the most visible is UN peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping within the UN framework for violent extremism

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[1] This is due to a range of political, ideological and legal factors, as well as the multidisciplinary approach which has been taken to study the phenomenon; see M. Nasser-Eddine *et. al.* (2011) *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review* (Edinburgh: Ministry of Defence, Australia).

[2] International Crisis Group (2016) "Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State", *Crisis Group Special Report*, 14 March.

protective equipment, including mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles; and testing the use of new technologies, including the use of advanced aerial surveillance tools to enhance the safety and security of bases and convoys.

In Mali, despite the establishment of a peace agreement between the Government and key armed groups, the mission operates in an environment of continued low-level insurgency, targeted attacks on the UN and spectacular attacks on civilian targets (e.g. hotels, hostage taking). In addition to defending itself against a significant direct threat from multiple extremist groups, MINUSMA has a mandate to prevent and deter attacks against civilians by armed groups of any persuasion. For this protection purpose, as with other similarly-mandated missions, the Security Council has authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In 2015, DPKO identified MINUSMA as a pilot Mission for CT/PVE national capacity building in the areas of rule of law and security. Efforts, in coordination with DPKO, CTED, CTITF, and other partners, include training and support to national security forces in first response, investigations, forensics analysis, and aspects of C-IED. MINUSMA is also playing a critical role in standing up the Specialized Counter Terrorism Judicial Unit and is supporting the Government's efforts to develop a national border security strategy aimed at preventing the movement of foreign terrorist fighters and proliferation of arms. MINUSMA is also supporting the development of a comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategy

A range of other peacekeeping operations, including MINUSCA, MONUSCO, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNMISS and MINUSTAH are also mandated to support the capacity of national institutions and actors, particularly rule of law and security institutions. In line with Pillar III of the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, UN peacekeeping operations, often have a comparative advantage as part of their programmatic support to the rule of law and security institutions, to contribute to counter terrorism capacity building efforts, inter alia, in judicial reform, the prevention of radicalization in detention facilities, security sector reform (SSR), border management and policing.,

Challenges

1- There is a need to adapt peacekeeping presences and activities to the emerging enviornment, including equip peacekeeping missions with the capabilities necessary to counter asymmetric threats and tactics through better access to intelligence, technology and IED threat mitigation programmes, while improving resilience through greater mobility and medical support capacity. There is also a need to consider how mandates tasks including in the areas of DDR and corrections support need to adapt in such environments.

2Addressing the dual threats of terrorism and 'violent extremism' and distinguishing terrorist groups from other non-state armed groups employing asymmetric violent tactics, as well as the diversity and fluidity of such groups, present a significant challenge for UN peacekeeping missions. Labelling armed groups "terrorists" or "violent extremists" can sometimes undermine a solid and nuanced understanding of these groups and the specific conflict contexts in which they operate, including their perception by local populations. This can limit the scope of missions to develop detailed analyses of the specificities of each context and/or group and to design tailored and appropriate responses. Moreover, the capacity of missions to analyse and assess such groups is often limited in the context of prevailing insecurity, the transnational operating patterns of these groups and limited

- What is the implication for relations with host States and local communities of UN peacekeeping engagement in addressing violent extremism?
- How could peacekeeping cooperate more effectively with other parts of the UN system on initiatives to counter and prevent violent extremism?
- What are the associated challenges and risks? To what extent can the Security Council mitigate those challenges, and how?

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Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Technology and innovation in peacekeeping", which was drafted for the meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 28 April 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
Ambassador
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Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "Technology and innovation in United Nations peacekeeping" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

I- BACKGROUND

The threats faced by United Nations peacekeeping operations are evolving rapidly. Mandates are becoming increasingly complex and the operating environments into which missions deploy are ever more challenging. It is therefore critical to ensure that peacekeeping operations possess the right tools to meet the challenges they face, so that peacekeeping remains an efficient and effective enterprise in years to come. In mid-2014 an Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping was appointed by the Under-Secretaries-General of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support to consider how modern technology could be leveraged to enhance the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions and overcome some of the emerging challenges they face. The Panel's report, released in February 2015, argues for wider deployment of technology in peacekeeping and proposes a new approach that enables innovative problem solving. The Panel's message was echoed by the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which recommended that the UN "embrace innovation and the responsible use of technology to bridge the considerable gap between what is readily available to and appropriate for UN peace operations and what is actually in use in the field today". In his report on the implementation of the High-Level Panel's recommendations, the Secretary-General pledged that technology would be a key element of the peacekeeping reform agenda. He stated also his conviction that the adoption of widely available and cost-effective technologies can make huge strides towards improving the safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets, as well the capacity to protect civilians and to implement mandates effectively. Furthermore, he underlined that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have put in place a strategy to implement the key recommendations of the recent Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in United Nations Peacekeeping.

II- OVERVIEW OF DPKO/DFS STRATEGY AND TECHNICAL AREAS OF WORK

DPKO/DFS strategy

This increased institutional focus on and support for technology in peacekeeping operations has provided a strong basis for significant steps taken by DPKO/DFS to enhance its work in this area and has precipitated a shift in DFS' focus toward strategic, field-focused technologies. In 2015, DPKO/DFS elaborated a strategy to implement the recommendations of the Expert Panel and initiated a progressive exercise to introduce new tools, working methods and operational approaches to technology in peacekeeping. The strategy, which operates in line with the broader ICT Strategy for the Secretariat, seeks to bring about a cultural shift towards embracing technology and innovation, including through continual and strengthened cooperation and dialogue with Member States and other stakeholders. In addition to implementing the technical recommendations of the Expert Panel, the strategy seeks to deliver a new approach that puts missions, users and substantive offices in a central role for identifying technological solutions. The strategy expands the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping, which provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation with Member States and other partners around technology for peacekeeping. The second annual Symposium for the Partnership was held in Vienna, Austria, in September 2015 and brought together representatives of over 30 Member States as well as academic institutions to explore creative and collaborative opportunities to enhance technology efforts in peacekeeping missions.

Technical areas of work

The follow are several key areas where the DPKO/DFS strategy seeks to achieve significant and immediate progress to overcome critical operational challenges.

Safety and security

Comprehensive technology suites appropriate to different mission environments can significantly improve safety and security of UN personnel, infrastructure and assets and enhance camp perimeter surveillance and control. DPKO/DFS is currently piloting the use of day and night optical sensors mounted on both fixed and mobile platforms, including balloons and aerostats which offer long-range, 360 degree visibility around their installation, providing us a longer horizon from a position of safety. Similar technology applied to mobile platforms

like quadcopters also supports more effective and safer patrolling and convoy protection. By using a combination of sensors, CCTV, motion sensors and infrared and ground radar together with mobile surveillance systems, missions will be in a better position to identify threats more quickly and respond more rapidly. In response to the High Level Panel on Technology and Innovation, UNMAS updated the "Landmine and Explosive Remnant of War Safety" mobile phone application to include information on IEDs. UNMAS is developing a strategy for sharing lessons learned, in cooperation with Member States with experience in IED threat mitigation. In contexts where prohibitions exist on the use of traditional explosive disposal tools, UNMAS is innovative, for example, by using a pyrotechnic torch that safely disposes of explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions, without the need for explosives.

Operational communications

At the heart of command and control communications is reliable connectivity and related enabling technologies. To enhance field connectivity beyond existing satellite networks, DFS is exploring a variety of new technologies to substantially increase the available coverage and bandwidth to field missions with the specific goal of reaching the "last mile" of operations, especially in austere environments where commercial terrestrial links are unavailable or unreliable. In this regard DFS is adding the use of newly available next-generation medium earth orbiting satellite networks to provide increased bandwidth to field missions at a lower cost, including to remote areas that were previously difficult to reach. This will enable a new breed of communication tools to capture and share information in missions.

Situational awareness and information-led operations

Better-informed decision making is critical to safe and effective mandate implementation and better information gathering, verification, analysis and reporting is crucial to information-led operations, situational awareness and a common operating picture. Implementing new technologies in these areas is an important part of DPKO/DFS efforts to expand the capacity of peacekeeping missions to identify conduct information-led operations and, where necessary and appropriate, to enable missions to gather information and analyse intelligence to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers and the implementation of the mandate. This increasingly includes the use of Unarmed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles by peacekeeping operations to identify threats, collect relevant data and better understand their operating environments. New technologies also offer significant opportunities to strengthen the uniformed capabilities of peacekeeping operations to address emerging rule of law threats, including transnational

organized crime. To better manage the vast amounts on event-based data gathered by peacekeeping missions and support analysis and decision-making, DPKO/DFS has rolled out Sage, a standardised, web-based incident tracking system that makes use of mobile applications and GIS visualization. UNMAS also now uses state-of-the-art technologies and information management systems, such as the Information Management System for Mine Action, to help facilitate mine action activities. Expanded use of GIS solutions will combine situational awareness regarding incidents together with mission-specific operational on detailed mission-specific base maps to support strategic and operational decision making, scenario modelling and planning.

Reducing peacekeeping's environmental footprint

DFS strives to deploy responsible missions that achieve maximum efficiency in their use of natural resources and operate at minimum risk to people, societies and ecosystems, contributing to a positive impact on these wherever possible. The systematic integration of alternative energy sources across all aspects of field operations and the incorporation of a life-cycle approach will significantly decrease missions' environmental footprints and reduce long-term costs. The use of alternative energy sources across all aspects of field operations will not only reduce operational costs in the long run, including the related supply chain for fuel delivery, but also supports more resilient operations. By shifting data centres and ICT infrastructure wherever possible to the UN private cloud hosted in the Global Service Centre (GSC), DFS/DPKO are able to maintain a light ICT infrastructure footprint in the field and reduced power demands. The Global Service Centre data centres, which have been recognized for their green use of solar power, in turn have a positive exponential effect on the field missions who have shifted their data hosting to the GSC.

III- CHALLENGES

As peacekeeping operations have increased their use of strategic technologies, a number of challenges have arisen which affect missions' ability to fully realize the potential of these technologies.

Ensuring full and consistent integration of new technologies

To integrate new technologies in peacekeeping operations, all personnel must have access to training in the operation and maintenance of new systems and tools deployed throughout missions to meet emerging requirements and implement innovative solutions. This requires a holistic approach that sets technical solutions within a larger concept of operations to ensure that personnel using the technologies are capable of operating them and taking appropriate action on the information they receive. This presents significant and unique challenges for peacekeeping operations, given the wide diversity of equipment and technological capacity among military and police units deployed to the field. The DPKO/DFS strategy therefore foresees development of exercises, new specialised training materials, and partnerships with Member States to train and equip units to higher standards of technological capacity. DFS, in partnership with TCCs and other Member States, has established a training academy in Entebbe to augment capacities of military signals units prior to deployment. The Signals Academy aims to standardise the basic curricula for signals units as well as tailored training for specific mission operating environments. This approach will improve the performance and capabilities of signals units, which are increasingly required to deploy in non-permissive environments.

Prototyping, field-testing and evaluating technologies

At present, the capacity of DPKO/DFS to leverage technology and integrate solutions into the operational environment of peacekeeping missions does not sufficiently support a process of identifying new technology opportunities, prototyping, field-testing, evaluating and optimizing these solutions. This is particularly difficult when interoperability requirements apply and/or technologies need to be field tested in harsh environments. As a result, DPKO/DFS must often procure equipment and services that are commercially available on the market for deployment in active field missions without the opportunity for sufficient field-testing and development of standard operating procedures for users. This has presented challenges for effectively incorporating new technologies in support of uniformed capabilities as well as other substantive areas of peacekeeping. In contrast, nearly all military or police forces worldwide test technologies, systems, solutions and procedures intensively before deploying them to live operations. To mitigate this issue, the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping is seeking strengthen partnerships with Member States and other entities that could enhance peacekeeping's solution development and testing capacity while remaining fully compliant with procurement rules.

Information security

As peacekeeping operations make increasing use of digital information, persistent concerns have arisen about the capacity of missions to securely and confidentially manage the gathering, storage and ultimate disposition of information. The sustainability of efforts to enhance peacekeeping mission's capabilities in this area will therefore depend on the Organization's capacity to put effective measures in place to satisfy these information management concerns. Information security in peacekeeping is dependent upon two programmes: sensitive information handling policy, training and awareness; and, an ICT infrastructure which ensures protection of information assets within the UN environment. To address the rising amount of digital information in peacekeeping, several steps have been taken including the development of a mandatory online training module on information sensitivity; procedures to automatically classify and protect sensitive information in line with Organizational policy; and an established ICT Security capacity in the GSC working in coordination with OICT to ensure a holistic approach to network and application level security controls and monitoring. This includes the implementation of the Secretariat ICT Security Plan across all field missions. Broader awareness of the risks in managing sensitive information and additional ICT controls are needed. To that end, peacekeeping will be engaging in outreach and assessments of missions handling of sensitive information, and will be implementing digital rights management tools to protect confidential materials.

IV- Key Questions for Consideration

- How can the use of technology be a way to achieve a cost-effective and efficient peacekeeping?
- How can the use of technology enhance the safety and security of UN peacekeeping operations?
- How can the use of technology enhance the tools and capabilities of UN peacekeeping operations to effectively carry out their mandates, in particular to protect civilians?
- How can effective cooperation between, PCCs, TCCs, host countries and the Secretariat be enhanced to reduce the capacities gaps and to promote a responsible use of technology in peacekeeping operations?

- How can concerns about the use of Unarmed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS) and drones, in particular the issue of confidentiality and information gathering and monitoring be addressed?
- How can the Security Council support the use of technology by peacekeeping operations by providing the Secretariat with a strong mandate to explore, procure and deploy new solutions?
- What can Member States do to facilitate the enhanced use of "green" technologies?
- How can the Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping be expanded?
- Can Member States help ensure systematic integration of new technologies through increased efforts to equip and build the capacity of TCCs/PCCs?

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Letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the concept note entitled "Policy framework on intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations", which was drafted for the meeting of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations that I chaired on 27 July 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 51, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Fodé **Seck**
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Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 30 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note on the theme "Policy framework for intelligence in United Nations peacekeeping operations" for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

[Original: English]

I- BACKGROUND

Peacekeeping operations have always gathered and analysed information to better ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers, understand their operating environments, and maintain a strategic overview of developments in the mission area. As peacekeeping missions have evolved, so too have the capabilities, processes and procedures required for these purposes. Particularly in high-tempo, complex and dangerous operating environments where peacekeepers are directly targeted, better and more systematic intelligence gathering, management and analysis practices are required. As requirements in this area continue to grow, and as the nature of the tools deployed to the field evolves, there is a need to strengthen the framework around intelligence in field missions and at DPKO Headquarters to articulate a consistent and principled approach to intelligence firmly grounded in United Nations values; to establish a robust regime of oversight and accountability; and to enable an effective, responsible, integrated and secure whole-of-mission approach.

It is to this end that the Secretariat, in close consultation with and in response to guidance from Member States, is developing a Policy Framework for Intelligence in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. This process has been iterative, relying heavily on the expertise of Member States to define the appropriate parameters within a United Nations peacekeeping context, recognizing that no single model will be appropriate for all missions. In the course of several engagements with Member States, a number of important areas for consideration have emerged. As another stage in this consultative process, this note captures some of these concerns and discusses proposed approaches to addressing these issues and mitigating risks. Feedback on these proposed approaches will inform the development of the Policy Framework, which will be the subject of ongoing dialogue with Member States in a variety of fora, including the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

II- ENHANCING THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Over the past several years the mandates of peacekeeping operations and the threats they face have led the Security Council, Member States and Secretariat to consider intelligence as critical in ensuring missions' safety, security and effectiveness. In addition to Mali, which is discussed below, current examples include the DRC, where the mission is mandated to conduct offensive operations against mobile armed groups in jungle terrain and provide operational support to the FARDC; South Sudan, where the highly volatile security situation can deteriorate into heavy fighting with little notice and pose grave threats to civilians; and Darfur, where peacekeepers' safety and security and freedom of movement is often threatened by armed criminal elements. The 2016 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/70/19) recognised such developments and, in paragraph 52, "…acknowledges the need to improve situational awareness, and to enhance the safety and security of peacekeepers, including through the use of modern technology as a complement to traditional ways such as human information gathering … [and] encourages the Secretariat to develop a more cohesive and integrated United Nations system for situational awareness … [and ensure] capabilities are integrated effectively into mission operations and the confidentiality of all data gathered by such assets is preserved".

Innovations at Headquarters and in the field

For uniformed components, much of the work to enhance intelligence capacities for peacekeeping operations has been conducted under the strategic Uniformed Capabilities Development Agenda, which seeks to fill critical current and anticipated capability gaps for military and police units in peacekeeping operations. Initiatives being implemented as part of this agenda include projects to increase the capacity of missions to operate effectively and safely in threat environments characterized by the use of improvised explosive devices; to better understand transnational factors by enhancing mission criminal intelligence and capacity building expertise; and to develop operational guidance for police components which, the Strategic Guidance Framework for United Nations Policing articulates an approach to intelligence-led and community-oriented policing.

In addition, several innovations originating in the field have contributed to enhanced intelligence/information analysis capacities. The deployment of unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to MONUSCO and subsequently other missions has added a new and

important dimension to information collected and analyzed by missions. Increased and more diverse modalities for engagement with local populations, such as the introduction of Community Liaison Assistants and the more systematic use of local perception surveys, have enabled a richer understanding of local populations and their priorities and concerns. The ongoing integration of the SAGE common incident tracking platform in field missions and rollout of a Mission Common Operational Picture (MCOP) data visualization platform will enhance situational awareness and decision making support that will help all mission components to plan and undertake mandated tasks safely and effectively.

MINUSMA and the ASIFU

In Mali, the mission is mandated to support stabilization and the implementation of a transitional roadmap while facing persistent threats of direct attacks from armed groups that employ asymmetric tactics. The nature of these threats prompted the Secretariat to deploy an All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) to MINUSMA, the first of its kind in a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The ASIFU brings a diverse variety of military intelligence capacities under a single command to acquire, fuse and analyse information into intelligence products in a centralized facility. The continued requirement for such capacities has been repeatedly reflected in guidance from the Security Council, which in paragraph 31 of resolution 2295 of 29 June 2016 requested the Secretary-General to take "all appropriate additional measures and, in consultation with troop contributing countries, to identify options, including seeking the support of Member States, to enhance the safety and security of MINUSMA's personnel to enable MINUSMA to execute effectively its mandate in a complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats, including through improving MINUSMA's intelligence capacities, including surveillance and monitoring capacities, within the limits of its mandate ...".

The deployment of an ASIFU in Mali has been an instructive experience for the Secretariat that will inform the development of the Policy Framework for Intelligence. In late 2015, a lessons learned exercise conducted by the Secretariat confirmed that an enhanced military intelligence function in MINUSMA was critical if the mission was to operate safely and effectively in such an environment. However, the exercise identified important opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of an intelligence structure in meeting the requirements of the mission in a United Nations multidimensional peacekeeping context. These included the full integration of functions performed by the ASIFU into the mission

structure, clear divisions of labour and coordination across the mission's uniformed and civilian components, including the Criminal Intelligence Unite and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre, and an approach to information security that would meet troop contributing countries' requirements for operational security while permitting an inclusive approach to information sharing. Based on these lessons, the exercise developed plans for a new intelligence architecture for MINUSMA designed to maximize the impact of all civilian, military and police intelligence and analysis assets, including the centralization of military intelligence functions in a single Force Headquarters organization. These recommendations are now being taken forward, in close collaboration with relevant troop contributing countries. The lessons learned exercise also identified a number of important policy issues that emerge from the use of intelligence assets in United Nations peacekeeping missions, many of which are reflected as part of this note.

III- KEY AREAS FOR CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POLICY FRAMEWORK

In February 2016 the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations conveyed to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations the Secretariat's intention to develop a Policy Framework for Intelligence in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as an iterative and consultative process relying heavily on the advice of Member States. Since then, several consultative engagements have taken place in a variety of fora, including a senior-level dialogue with Member States on 31 May 2016, in which the Secretariat presented an initial set of areas to be covered by the Policy Framework, including overarching principles, scope, key definitions structures and functions of an intelligence cycle, and legal considerations, and sought feedback from Member States.

During this and other engagements, a number of key areas for consideration have been raised as common concerns for Member States and the Secretariat. Identifying and implementing satisfactory solutions for these issues will be critical to ensuring the effectiveness and sustainability of intelligence as a function of United Nations peacekeeping operations. This will require sustained and detailed collaboration between the Secretariat and Member States. The following is a non-exhaustive list of key areas requiring discussion and, ultimately, resolution as part of the process to develop the Policy Framework. For each, aspects of potential approaches identified by the Secretariat are presented for consideration by Member States.

Information gathering and analysis

Definitions, limitations and parameters for operations: For some, the use of the term "intelligence" raises a number of questions about its meaning in a United Nations peacekeeping context. At its core, intelligence is a relatively neutral term describing information that has been 1) collected according to set requirements and 2) processed and analyzed to identify meaning. However, many associate the term with clandestine tactics and practices. Member States have thus questioned how the Secretariat will define intelligence in a manner that is consistent with the principles, doctrine and policies of the United Nations.

To address this concern, the Policy Framework would explicitly state that peacekeeping operations would not, except under exceptional circumstances, collect information by clandestine technical or human means and would be fully transparent in the tools they use. The Policy Framework would reinforce respect for all existing international legal and human rights obligations of mission and would refer to applicable elements of the United Nations Charter and international human rights and humanitarian law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that would require missions to "avoid arbitrary or unlawful interference with [the] privacy, family, home or correspondence," of individuals. The operational and tactical limitations implied by these parameters could be reflected in mission-specific Intelligence Support Plans or Standing Operating Procedures, which would identify the appropriate (and inappropriate) techniques, tactics and procedures for intelligence in the mission and detail how the mission's intelligence activities will be regulated within the oversight and accountability regime established by the Policy Framework.

Sensor information gathering near neighboring countries: A number of Member States that border countries hosting peacekeeping operations have expressed concern that information collection tools, particularly aerial surveillance assets, could violate their sovereignty by gathering information on or about their territories. Although the legal foundations for peacekeeping operations clearly limit missions' activities to their areas of operations – i.e., within the host state – some have nevertheless expressed concern that

sensors collecting information near borders might inadvertently cross boundaries or collect information from neighbouring countries.

Since the first deployment of unmanned aerial systems to MONUSCO, the Secretariat has identified and implemented a number of lessons to mitigate the risk of entering into the airspace or inadvertently acquiring information on neighboring countries, including the development of guidance establishing areas of controlled access with progressive levels of authorization. Moreover, sensors can be programmed to exercise "shutter control" to limit their focus to authorized areas only. Provisions for such measures could be reflected in the Policy Framework as an integral element of a mission's Intelligence Support Plan or Standing Operating Procedure.

Information security and confidentiality

For mission intelligence systems to operate effectively and responsibly, the Secretariat must be able to ensure that sensitive information managed within the system and products disseminated by the system will be treated securely and with due respect for confidentiality. This is critical in at least two respects: first, to ensure the operational security of the mission, limit the dissemination of sensitive information within the mission, and protect sources and personnel; and, second, to meet the national operational security requirements of TCCs/PCCs that have deployed units that contribute to the missions' intelligence acquisitions, such as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) units and relevant Specialized Police Teams.

Secure systems. Missions that employ more robust intelligence capabilities or regularly handle highly sensitive information may require enhanced secure information management and communications systems beyond those normally used in peacekeeping operations. Such systems require sophisticated technological solutions as well as detailed management and oversight mechanisms for those working within them, and can be costly. As part of efforts to enhance the intelligence capabilities of MINUSMA, for example, the Secretariat is in the process of acquiring and deploying a United Nations-managed secure system covering the military intelligence structure to replace a similar system initially deployed as part of the ASIFU. The technical requirements and roles and responsibilities for the management of this system are being developed in close collaboration with relevant TCCs and could inform the eventual deployment of a system with broader coverage.

Classification and handling: While classification standards, roles and responsibilities, and handling procedures for sensitive information are clearly established by United Nations[1] and DPKO/DFS[2] policy, it is widely acknowledged that, in reality, information handling, oversight and accountability practices in United Nations peacekeeping operations may not always be sufficient to maintain the confidence of Member States. To address this gap, the forthcoming deployment of the United Nations-managed secure information management and communications system in the MINUSMA military intelligence structure has spurred detailed planning and development of practice on issues of access rights and electronic oversight tools, physical premises architecture, ISR unit liaison mechanisms and human resources modalities in the U-2, in close consultation with relevant TCCs. Once implemented, this approach can be learned from and replicated elsewhere as appropriate, which will require additional considerations in relation to the civilian and police components. More broadly, the Policy Framework could establish a clear regime of responsibility, accountability and oversight for the handling of information within the intelligence cycle at all stages of the chains of custody and command.

Information ownership

Legally, all information gathered by units or personnel (civilian or uniformed) deployed as part of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is the property of the mission, regardless of where or by whom it is held. As such, the management, use and sharing of this information is the sole decision of the United Nations. With the introduction of more advanced intelligence tools, tactics and procedures to peacekeeping operations, however, this principle will need to be reconciled with the national legal frameworks of many TCCs/PCCs, which include requirements to manage information so as to maintain operational security and minimize risk. This has given rise to calls for the Secretariat to clarify issues of information ownership and handling and set clear parameters for the flow, retention and disposal of information gathered by units or individuals operating as part of peacekeeping operations.

To bring clarity to these issues, the Policy Framework would outline the principles and limitations for the use, storage, retention and disposal of information gathered by peacekeeping operations and strengthen the provisions governing the use of collection assets

[1] ST/SGB/2007/6 on information sensitivity, classification and handling, for the purposes of ensuring the classification and secure handling of confidential information entrusted to or originating from the United Nations.
[2] DPKO/DFS Standard Operating Procedure on Access to Information (2010).

by TCCs/PCCs in missions. For example, Letters of Assist for airframes provided by TCCs for use by ISR units could be amended to include detailed terms for the use of information gathered by the tools, regardless of where the information is held and at which stage of custody; similar provision are currently included in agreements for airframes managed as mission assets.

IV- KEY QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

- Do the areas for consideration described in this document reflect the priorities and concerns of Member States for development of the Policy Framework and for the effective, responsible and efficient execution of intelligence activities in peacekeeping operations? Are there any other areas that should be addressed?
- Would the approaches proposed in this document satisfy Member States concerns in these key areas?
- What coordination and management approaches are required to enable a fully integrated, whole-of-mission (i.e. integrated civilian and uniformed) approach to intelligence?
- What oversight functions would be required at all levels to maintain trust in mission intelligence structures?

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General Assembly

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Seventy-first session
Agenda items 134 and 98 (kk)

Programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017

General and complete disarmament: taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations

Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions considered the statement submitted by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/71/12) in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly on the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41 on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. During its consideration of the statement, the Advisory Committee met representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with responses received on 28 November 2016.

2. Under the terms of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, the General Assembly would:

(a) Decide to convene a United Nations conference in 2017 to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination;

(b) Decide that the conference shall convene in New York, under the rules of procedure of the Assembly unless otherwise agreed by the conference, from 27 to 31 March and from 15 June to 7 July 2017, with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society representatives;

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(c) Decide that the conference will hold a one-day organizational session in New York as soon as possible;

(d) Decide that the conference shall submit a report on its progress to the Assembly at its seventy-second session, which will assess the progress made in the negotiations and decide the way forward;

(e) Request the Secretary-General to provide the support necessary to convene the conference and to transmit the report of the conference to the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission and to the United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament foreseen in paragraph 6 of resolution 68/32.

II. Resource requirements

3. The Secretary-General indicates that the request would entail additional resource requirements in the amount of $692,600 for the following activities:

(a) Meetings services in the amount of $252,000 (see A/C.1/71/L.41, operative paragraphs 8, 10 and 11), for a total of 42 meetings (21 days) in New York with interpretation in the six official languages, as follows:

(i) A one-day organizational meeting, consisting of 2 meetings, early in 2017;

(ii) A five-day first session, consisting of 10 meetings, from 27 to 31 March 2017;

(iii) A 15-day second session, consisting of 30 meetings, from 15 June to 7 July 2017;

(b) Documentation services in the amount of $440,600 (see A/C.1/71/L.41, operative paragraphs 8, 10, 13 and 14), consisting of 12 pre-session documents (31,800 words), 18 in-session documents (47,700 words) and 2 post-session documents (21,400 words) in the six official languages.

4. It is indicated in the statement that the requested activities referred to in the draft resolution relate to programme 1, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, and programme 3, Disarmament, of the biennial programme plan and priorities for the period 2016-2017 (see A/69/6/Rev.1) and section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, and section 4, Disarmament, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 (A/70/6 (Sect. 2) and A/70/6 (Sect. 4), respectively). It is also indicated that, to meet the provisions of the draft resolution, the outputs under subprogramme 2 of section 4, Disarmament, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 would need to be amended in respect of the information and outreach activities during the implementation of the budget (see A/C.5/71/12, para. 7).

5. It is indicated that additional conference-servicing resources in the amount of $692,600 under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, would be required under the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 to implement the additional workload. It is also

indicated that it is not possible to identify activities within the relevant sections of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 that could be terminated, deferred, curtailed or modified during the biennium and it would therefore be necessary for the requested resources to be provided through an additional appropriation, representing a charge against the contingency fund (see A/C.5/71/12, paras. 9 and 11).

III. Conclusion

6. **Taking into account paragraph 5 above, the Advisory Committee recommends that the Fifth Committee inform the General Assembly that, should the Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.41, an additional appropriation of $692,600 would be required under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, representing a charge against the contingency fund.**

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Programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017

General and complete disarmament: treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions considered the statement submitted by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/71/13) in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly on the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1 on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. During its consideration of the statement, the Advisory Committee met representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with responses received on 28 November 2016.

2. Under the terms of draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1, the General Assembly would:

(a) Request the Secretary-General to establish a high-level expert preparatory group on a fissile material cut-off treaty, with a membership of 25 States chosen on the basis of equitable geographical representation, which will

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operate by consensus[1] without prejudice to national positions in future negotiations, and which will meet in Geneva for two sessions of two weeks each, the first in 2017 and the second in 2018, to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of a future non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The preparatory group will also examine, the report of the Group of Governmental Experts, mandated pursuant to resolution 67/53, as contained in document A/70/81, as well as the views submitted by Member States as contained in documents A/68/154 and Add.1 and A/71/140 and Add.1;

(b) Request the Chair of the high-level expert preparatory group on a fissile material cut-off treaty to organize, in New York, two two-day informal consultative meetings, open-ended so that all Member States can engage in interactive discussions and share their views, which the Chair shall convey to the preparatory group for its consideration;

(c) Call upon the Secretary-General to transmit the report of the high-level expert preparatory group on a fissile material cut-off treaty to the General Assembly at its seventy-third session and to the Conference on Disarmament prior to its 2019 session;

(d) Request the Secretary-General to render the high-level expert preparatory group on a fissile material cut-off treaty and its Chair all the necessary assistance, including the provision of relevant documents.

II. Resource requirements

3. The Secretary-General indicates that the request would entail additional resource requirements in the amount of $591,800 for the following activities:

(a) Meetings services in the amount of $164,900 for both 2017 and 2018 (see A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1, operative paragraphs 2 and 3), for a total of 48 meetings with interpretation in the six official languages, consisting of 20 meetings in both 2017 and 2018 (each session being of 10 days' duration) in Geneva of the high-level expert preparatory group on a fissile material cut-off treaty and 4 meetings in both 2017 and 2018 in New York organized by the Chair of the preparatory group. The requirements include sound technician and recording services amounting to $6,900 in Geneva;

(b) Documentation services in the amount of $131,000 in both 2017 and 2018 (see A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1, operative paragraphs 2-4 and 7), consisting of 5 pre-session documents (8,500 words) in the six official languages, 25 in-session documents (33,000 words) in English only and 1 post-session document (10,700 words) in the six official languages.

4. It is indicated in the statement that the requested activities referred to in the draft resolution relate to programme 1, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, programme 3, Disarmament, and

[1] The high-level expert preparatory group on a fissile material cut-off treaty will be governed by the rules and established practices applicable to groups of governmental experts.

programme 25, Management and support services, of the biennial programme plan and priorities for the period 2016-2017 (see A/69/6/Rev.1) and section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, section 4, Disarmament, and section 29F, Administration, Geneva, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 (A/70/6 (Sect. 2), A/70/6 (Sect. 4) and A/70/6 (Sect. 29F), respectively). It is also indicated that, to meet the provisions of the draft resolution, the outputs under section 4, Disarmament, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 would need to be amended in respect of activities during the implementation of the budget (see A/C.5/71/13, para. 6).

5. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the services of sound technicians in Geneva ($6,900 for both 2017 and 2018) would be required because the operators were responsible for starting up the audiovisual system, verifying that all functions of the system were operational before the meetings, monitoring the meetings and activities in progress, operating the recording system and performing post-meeting tidying and shutdown activities. The Committee was also provided with the standard cost components and parameters applied for conference services in terms of interpretation costs and meetings support staff costs across four conference-servicing locations, including New York and Geneva. **The Committee notes that the costs relating to sound technicians are not included within the cost components for meetings support services and is of the view that the cost parameters should include all applicable costing elements. The Committee therefore recommends against the approval of the requested resources for sound technicians in the amount of $6,900 for both 2017 and 2018.**

6. It is indicated in the statement that additional conference-servicing resources in the amount of $591,800 under sections 2 and 29F (see para. 4 above) would be required under the programme budget for the bienniums 2016-2017 and 2018-2019 to implement the additional workload. It is also indicated that it is not possible to identify activities within the relevant sections of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017 that could be terminated, deferred, curtailed or modified during the biennium and it would therefore be necessary for the requested resources of $295,900 for 2017 to be provided through an additional appropriation, representing a charge against the contingency fund for 2016-2017, and for the amount of $295,900 for 2018 to be included in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019 (see A/C.5/71/13, paras. 8, 10 and 11).

III. Conclusion

7. **Taking into account paragraphs 5 and 6 above, the Advisory Committee recommends that the Fifth Committee inform the General Assembly that, should the Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/71/L.65/Rev.1, an additional appropriation of $289,000 would be required under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs and conference management, of the programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, representing a charge against the contingency fund.**

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 31
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 12 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the address of the Parliament of Ukraine to the parliaments of foreign States, parliamentary assemblies and international organizations regarding the elections of the Russian Parliament on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (see annex).

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 31 of its seventy-first session, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 12 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Address of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Parliament of Ukraine) to the parliaments of foreign States, parliamentary assemblies and international organizations regarding the elections of the Russian Parliament on the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea

Taking into account the attempt of the Russian Federation to conduct elections to the Russian State Duma on 18 September 2016 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which are temporarily occupied by Russia,

Underlining that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are integral parts of the sovereign territory of Ukraine,

Emphasizing that respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and support of international peace and security remain a bedrock of international relations and international law,

Highlighting that the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 68/262 entitled "Territorial integrity of Ukraine", adopted on 27 March 2014, affirmed its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and also called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the referendum held on 16 March 2014 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status,

Taking into account the fact that the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation were condemned in numerous decisions of the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe and resolutions of the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Proceeding from the principle position of the international community regarding the condemnation of the occupation and the non-recognition of the annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,

Recognizing that the presence of deputies in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation elected in the territory occupied by the Russian Federation calls into question the legitimacy of the entire lower house of the Russian Parliament and that recognition of the results of the elections will be considered to be an act of certain legitimization of the ongoing illegal occupation of the Crimean Peninsula,

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine:

Requests the parliaments of foreign States, parliamentary assemblies and international organizations to abstain from the participation in the observation of

illegal Russian parliamentary elections in Crimea and also calls upon them not to recognize the results of such elections under any circumstances;

Stresses that all foreigners who visit the occupied territory of Ukraine to take part in the observation of the illegal elections will be brought to criminal responsibility for violating Ukrainian law. The law enforcement agencies of Ukraine will open criminal cases for violations of the rules of entry into the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine with the purpose of causing harm to the national interests of Ukraine;

Requests foreign parliaments, parliamentary assemblies and international organizations to make official statements on the illegitimacy of recognition of the results of the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation on account of their being held on the territory of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Such statements will prove the illegitimacy of the representatives of the Russian Parliament who will be elected as a result on the territory of Crimea;

Requests authoritative international organizations to do their best to avoid the inclusion of the Russian Members of Parliament elected in the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea in the Russian parliamentary delegations to the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, given that such activity may indirectly indicate the legitimization of the occupation and annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula;

Assumes that only the steadfast position of foreign States and international organizations on the continuous condemnation of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and further condemnation of the occupation and non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea will support the restoration of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of our State within its internationally recognized borders.

8 September 2016

United Nations A/71/664

General Assembly

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 114 (c)
Elections to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other elections: election of five members of the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission

Letter dated 28 November 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

The United States delegation has been pleased to serve as facilitator in the selection of candidates for the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission from among those qualifying to serve in the membership category of the countries that are the leading financial contributors to the United Nations.

The leading financial contributors selected for the Organizational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission during its sixth term (2017-2018) are Brazil, Canada, Germany, Japan and Norway.

This selection was conducted transparently with colleagues and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645 (2005) establishing the Peacebuilding Commission.

(*Signed*) Samantha **Power**

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Seventy-first session
Agenda item 30
The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict

Note verbale dated 6 December 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, pursuant to paragraph 28 of General Assembly resolution 70/252, entitled "The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts", is pleased to transmit, on behalf of the Chair of the Kimberley Process, the 2016 Kimberley Process report and the final communique of the Kimberly Process plenary meeting held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, from 13 to 17 November 2016 (see annex and enclosure).

The Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates would be grateful if the present note verbale and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 30.

16-21772 (E) 151216

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Annex to the note verbale dated 6 December 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Report of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to the General Assembly for 2016

Submitted by the United Arab Emirates, Chair of the Kimberley Process for 2016

Introduction

1. The fourteenth Kimberley Process plenary meeting was held from 13 to 17 November 2016 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

Africa Initiative

2. At the beginning of 2016, the Kimberley Process Chair adopted a hands-on approach to assisting diamond-producing countries in need, particularly in Africa.

3. During the year, the Chair visited Armenia, Angola, Belgium, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, India, Japan, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, South Africa, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe and Hong Kong, China, focusing not only on the existing member countries or territories of the Kimberley Process, but also on those which might join the organization.

4. The plenary expressed its great appreciation for the active leadership by the United Arab Emirates Chair of the Kimberley Process, including through frequent travel, raising public awareness of the Process, demonstrating leadership on the Central African Republic and putting forth innovative proposals to strengthen the Process.

Rotation of working groups

5. The Committee on Participation and Chairmanship, the Committee on Rules and Procedures, the Working Group on Monitoring, the Working Group on Statistics, the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production, the Working Group of Diamond Experts and the monitoring team on the Central African Republic held meetings during the Kimberley Process plenary.

6. According to the decision on three-year rotation of the Chairs of the Working Groups, the plenary adopted the following changes:

(a) Namibia became the Vice-Chair of the Working Group of Diamond Experts;

(b) China became the Vice-Chair of the Committee on Rules and Procedures;

(c) The European Union would hand over its role and duties to South Africa as the incoming Chair of the Working Group on Monitoring within a period of three months from January 2017, to ensure a smooth and seamless transition;

(d) Botswana became the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Monitoring;

(e) India became the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Statistics;

(f) The plenary approved the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production in 2017 and the Chair in 2018.

7. The United Arab Emirates also became the Chair of the Committee on Participation and Chairmanship after being a Chair of the Kimberley Process in 2016.

Working Group of Diamond Experts

8. The Working Group of Diamond Experts and its scientific subgroup conducted extensive research on improvements of the footprint of diamonds from the Central African Republic. Export shipment data from the compliant zone of the sub-prefecture of Berberati (May, July and September) were scrutinized and added to the production footprint of that country.

9. The Working Group of Diamond Experts subgroup on valuation continued its work on mapping country approaches to the valuation of rough diamonds to provide comprehensive reference for all Kimberley Process members.

10. The subgroup on valuation furthered the ongoing work in collecting responses to the valuation survey by participants, and noted that about 20 Kimberley Process participants had not yet completed their surveys. The plenary took note of the December 2016 deadline for completing the survey. The subgroup also updated its action plan.

11. The plenary requested the Working Group of Diamond Experts subgroup on valuation to invite the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to collaborate with the Kimberley Process to take the work forward, consistent with rules and procedures.

Valuation of rough diamonds

12. On the basis of the initial work of the Working Group of Diamond Experts subgroup on valuation, the plenary recognized the efforts of and took note of the proposals made by the Chair to develop a uniform methodology on the valuation of rough diamonds.

13. Throughout 2016, the topic of valuation of rough diamonds has been the subject of much debate among stakeholders in the diamond industry.

14. Delegates at dedicated forums on that topic agreed that it was vital for the future of diamond-producing countries to better manage their resources, and to

improve the living conditions of industry workers and miners, especially those in the artisanal- and alluvial-diamond-producing nations of Africa.

15. Under the Kimberley Process umbrella, both the 2012 Washington Declaration on Integrating Development of Artisanal and Small-Scale Diamond Mining with Kimberley Process Implementation and the 2005 Moscow Declaration on Improving Internal Controls over Alluvial Diamond Production, initial attempts were made to tackle the valuation of rough diamonds. These declarations were outlined as policy goals and recommendations, but fell short of actionable steps for the industry.

16. In that regard, the Chair organized, on the margins of the Kimberley Process meetings, three workshops intended to leverage the expertise and knowledge of industry players and channel them towards establishing best practices for the valuation of rough diamonds.

17. The first special forum was held in collaboration with OECD. Industry players from throughout the diamond pipeline, including institutions, civil society, experts and miners, were invited to attend.

18. The Forum was called upon to clarify the process of valuation of rough diamonds. The initiative was aimed at reinforcing and strengthening the debate, while agreeing on a consensus for universal conformity. The special forum was also aimed at developing a set of best practice principles to help level the playing field for import and export diamond centres.

19. In association with the Antwerp World Diamond Centre, a second special forum of the Chair was organized in Antwerp, Belgium, focusing on valuation practices employed by the global diamond industry. The three pillars of the Kimberley Process were invited: government, industry and civil society. Representatives from mining companies, auction and tender experts, professional diamond valuators, polished-price index specialists and OECD also took part in the discussion.

20. The format was an "expert workshop", an open dialogue to examine other methods being used that will eventually be developed into a more formalized approach to the valuation of rough diamonds.

21. The Chair hosted the third and final special forum, continuing the discussions and moving forward on the progress already made during such a short period. That forum was held on 13 November 2016, with the intention of reaching a consensus around a generic set of criteria identified during the first two special forums.

22. The plenary noted that, according to the Chair and some participants of the special forums, such a methodology might comprise several elements to be used by Kimberley Process participants, including using standardized preparation and sorting protocols for rough diamonds in preparation for valuation, drawing on contemporary transacted prices for comparable rough diamonds as much as possible and, where this was not possible, potentially developing a methodology based on deriving the value of rough diamonds from contemporary transactions that was transparent in its approach and objective and that drew upon industry practices.

Committee on Participation and Chairmanship: Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Gabon

23. After the self-suspension of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from the Kimberley Process in June 2008, the Process successfully conducted a first review mission in April 2016 to examine that country's compliance with the minimal requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, as the country claimed that it had finished implementing all the necessary changes and was ready to be readmitted. The review mission team adopted a positive report, which was discussed during the intersessional meeting.

24. In November, the plenary adopted a decision on the full participation of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in the Kimberley Process, including resumption of trading in rough diamonds starting on 17 November 2016. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela committed to hosting a review visit no later than six months after the resumption of exports.

25. Progress was also achieved on the admission Gabon as a member of the Kimberley Process. The plenary encouraged that country to invite an expert mission before the 2017 intersessional meeting in order to begin its admission process.

Working Group on Monitoring

26. The Working Group on Monitoring provided an update on the state of implementation of its rolling work programme for 2016, which included both recurrent activities designed to implement the revised administrative decision on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme peer review system and actions to follow up on relevant conclusions from the 2015 plenary that had been held in Luanda.

27. The plenary took note of the results of the 2016 annual reporting exercise, as the main comprehensive and regular source of information on implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme by participants, and welcomed the submission of annual reports on implementation of the Scheme in 2015 by 52 participants representing 79 countries. The Working Group on Monitoring requested the Committee on Participation and Chairmanship to deal with the one case of late submission (Panama). The plenary reviewed the assessment of annual reports and encouraged participants to continue submitting substantive annual reports on national implementation of the Scheme.

28. The plenary took note of reports on the review visits conducted in Armenia, Belarus, the Congo, Lesotho and the United Republic of Tanzania, and invited those five participants to report back on implementation of the recommendations at the next intersessional meeting, in line with the revised administrative decision on the peer review system. The plenary also took note of reports on the preliminary findings and observations on the review visits conducted in the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and the European Union, and requested the respective review visit and review mission teams to finalize their reports before the end of the year.

29. The plenary took note of the continued discussions by the Working Group on Monitoring on the guidance note on the organization and the conduct of review visits, as prepared on the basis of contributions and best practice examples shared by a number of members of the Working Group who had served as team leaders of review visits. The plenary considered the new guidance note an important practical tool enabling both review visit team members and host participants to prepare optimally for the successful conduct of review visits, and invited the Working Group to explore ways in which those guidelines could be reflected in future revisions to the administrative decision on the peer review system.

Central African Republic

30. On 18 March, the Kimberley Process Central African Republic monitoring team endorsed the report on its field mission to Berberati from 1 to 4 March 2016 and validated the proposal from the follow-up committee to designate the Berberati sub-prefecture as a "compliant zone", as per the requirements of the administrative decision on an operational framework for the resumption of exports of rough diamonds from that country.

31. As a result of the progress achieved in March, at the request of the Chair of the Working Group on Monitoring, the United Arab Emirates agreed to lead the Central African Republic monitoring team.

32. The plenary acknowledged the progress made by the Central African Republic with regard to implementation of the administrative decision and the operational framework for the resumption of exports of rough diamonds from that country, and welcomed the decisions of the Kimberley Process monitoring team to declare the sub-prefectures of Berberati, Boda, Carnot and Nola "compliant zones". The plenary encouraged the Kimberley Process authorities of the Central African Republic to continue implementing both the administrative decision and the recommendations from the report of the Process monitoring team on its field missions to Berberati, Boda, Carnot, Gadzi and Nola in March and August 2016, and to continue implementing enhanced vigilance measures and ensure the traceability of rough diamonds from all four "compliant zones". The plenary invited the Process monitoring team to continue ensuring a smooth inspection process regarding proposed export shipments as per its term of reference, and to further support the Process authorities of the Central African Republic in carrying out the envisaged forensic audit of the stockpiles.

33. The plenary took note of a recommendation from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established by the Security Council in its resolution 2127 (2013), whose mandate had been extended by the Council in its resolution 2262 (2016), to the tripartite follow-up committee of the Central African Republic and the Kimberley Process monitoring team to ensure continued monitoring of the freedom of movement in all compliant zones, consistent with proposed benchmarks.

34. The plenary noted that the representative of the Working Group of Diamond Experts on the Central African Republic monitoring team had briefed Working Group members on the work of the monitoring team over the past months. With regard to the role of the Working Group in the monitoring team, four proposed shipments had been assessed by the diamond expert team. Three of those shipments

had been approved for export. The plenary noted that the Working Group had decided to form a second diamond expert team to account for an expected increase in exports from compliant zones in the Central African Republic.

15. The plenary noted that the Central African Republic monitoring team had agreed on terms of reference intended to facilitate a forensic audit of the pre- and post-suspension stockpiles of rough diamonds in the Central African Republic, as foreseen in the operational framework of the 2015 administrative decision on that country.

16. In that context, the plenary welcomed the resumption of the development assistance project of the United States of America in the Central African Republic with a view to enhancing the capacity of that country and assisting it with the implementation of the administrative decision and operational framework for the resumption of exports of rough diamonds, and encouraged other participants and observers to consider providing complementary technical assistance.

17. The plenary welcomed the initiative taken by the Central African Republic and its neighbouring Kimberley Process participants (Cameroon, the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) to ensure cooperation on Kimberley Process Certification Scheme compliance issues with a regional dimension and encouraged the Central African Republic and the Process monitoring team to continue working closely together with relevant United Nations actors, notably the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, as well as the international community.

Permanent secretariat

18. During the year, the Chair faced a concern related to some structural shortcomings within the existing Kimberley Process framework that need to be addressed in order to make the process more robust.

19. The work carried out by members of the working groups has been vital to giving the Kimberley Process the international standing it has today, and the efforts of the Administrative Support Mechanism in enhancing engagement and communication have been equally essential in putting the foundation in place for the initiative. Nonetheless, despite successes in these areas, there needs to be a permanent structure in place to drive the process forward.

20. One of the primary issues involves the process for the re-entry of countries into the organization. The Kimberley Process has always been instrumental in stemming the flow of conflict diamonds globally; over the past decade, sanctions have been effective in places where mining conditions have been found to be non-compliant. However, once countries resolve these issues and return to the path of normalization, re-entry into the Process is a long and complex process, as the right structural and institutional framework is not in place. This has been witnessed first-hand by the working groups from the experience with the Central African Republic.

21. To address this deficit, the Kimberley Process is in dire need of a well-structured permanent body to take over the work that today is done by many hard-

working volunteers who also have regular jobs. As a result of the discussions, the plenary welcomed a proposal received from the Chair aimed at strengthening the structure of the Process through the establishment of a Kimberley Process secretariat. Such a secretariat could support the continuity and efficiency of the Process. The plenary decided that the upcoming review cycle provided an opportunity to discuss means of improving the Process. The proposal stated that such a secretariat could potentially help facilitate the progress of the Process in advancing its goals and objectives and, among other possibilities, for example, serve as a sustained presence maintaining contacts in countries of concern, support the Chair in interactions with government officials and other stakeholders, and assist the Process with regard to participants who had been suspended and were resuming participation in the Process. In that regard, the plenary looked forward to possible future ways to enhance cooperation with the United Nations system.

Working Group on Statistics

42. The plenary noted the request of the Working Group on Statistics that the Committee on Participation and Chairmanship take action consistent with the November 2005 guidelines with respect to the non-submission of statistics. That approach included measures concerning participants who failed to submit their statistical reports consistent with annex III to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme document.

43. The plenary noted the adoption by the Working Group on Statistics of a template for automated charts and tables that members of the Working Group intended to use in the preparation of the annual statistical analyses. The automation of the reports was expected to reduce the amount of time members spent on the development of the annual statistical analyses and to reduce the burden on members in preparing them.

44. The plenary noted that the Working Group on Statistics had initiated a fourth iteration of the annual data anomaly questionnaire process, which was used to identify anomalies and discrepancies in reported Kimberley Process statistics.

Blockchain technology

45. The Kimberley Process Chair announced an initiative on the possibility of introducing blockchain technology to support the efforts of the Process community in combating any potential fraudulent activity and to reduce transactional costs while increasing security measures.

46. Currently, each participating Kimberley Process country has its own method for issuing certificates and storing the resulting information. A blockchain-backed database could provide a secure way to issue and record certificates, preventing the counterfeiting of certificates, creating a more extensive data network and possibly even providing a clearer window into the international movement of diamonds. Accordingly, the technology could eventually eliminate the need for physical Process certificates.

47. The Chair examined the benefits of blockchain technology and presented the results of the research at the opening of the plenary meeting in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on 14 November. The Chair proposed that the Kimberley Process start using blockchain technology to track import and export statistics under the umbrella of the Working Group on Statistics by creating a system with 54 participants, in which every country would be able to upload secure data on every export shipment based on the Process certificate.

48. Taking into consideration the complexity of the topic, the plenary noted the presentation given by the Chair's office to the Working Group on Statistics on blockchain technology within the Kimberley Process. The Working Group welcomed further discussions on the study of blockchain technology within the framework of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

Mano River Union

49. Further steps have been taken by the Mano River Union countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) to implement the regional approach initiative as highlighted by the Security Council in its resolution 2153 (2014), in which it lifted the embargo on the export of rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire.

50. The plenary welcomed the continuous support to the Mano River Union countries provided by the Working Group on Monitoring technical team and the Friends of the Mano River Union group, in particular ongoing efforts to formalize the role of the Mano River Union secretariat and involve other implementing partners and or technical assistance providers.

51. The plenary also took note of an update provided by the property rights and artisanal diamond development project, co-funded by the United States and the European Union, and a presentation made by the European Union on their ongoing and planned development assistance in support of the Mano River Union regional approach. The plenary encouraged all participants and observers to continue working closely with the Mano River Union countries and continue addressing their technical assistance needs.

Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production

52. The plenary noted and endorsed the concerns identified by Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production participants over the lack of geological surveys in their respective countries. Such studies would help determine areas viable for artisanal mining, the expected volume of production and the expected number of years that the diamond deposits would last. Working Group participants called upon other Kimberley Process participants and potential donors to provide the technical assistance necessary for geological surveys. The plenary noted that Working Group participants supported the development of policies related to data management in their respective countries.

53. The plenary noted that participants of the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production continued engaging to align and integrate, within their national and regional development action plans regarding the mining sector, the effective

implementation of the recommendations contained in the Moscow Declaration on Improving Internal Controls over Alluvial Diamond Production and the Washington Declaration on Integrating Development of Artisanal and Small-Scale Diamond Mining with Kimberley Process Implementation.

54. The plenary acknowledged the effort made by the African countries of the Mano River Union and other initiatives and agencies, as well as the Diamond Development Initiative, the United States and the European Union, to provide the capacity and resources necessary to effectively drive the implementation of the Moscow and Washington Declarations.

Committee on Rules and Procedures

55. The plenary noted the approval of the Committee on Rules and Procedures of a version of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme core document that reflected the changes to the core document approved in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2013 under decision 1/2013, on modification of the core document of the Certification Scheme. Under that decision, the changes applied as at 1 January 2015.

56. The plenary asked the Administrative Support Mechanism to publish the revised core document on the official Kimberley Process website for informational purposes.

57. The plenary noted the decision of the Committee on Rules and Procedures to continue work on a document entitled "Practical Kimberley Process guidance: how to conduct surveys of Kimberley Process participants and observers".

Strengthening civil society participation

58. Since the inception of the Kimberley Process, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been at the forefront of fighting against illicit trafficking and trade in conflict diamonds. However, when it comes to participating in Process meetings or review missions, their involvement is far less than that of industry players, which is driven primarily by funding reasons. For example, for intersessional or plenary meetings, industry representatives usually send an average of 25 participants, but only 2 or 3 from civil society attend.

59. Since a balanced representation of these NGOs is vital to the success of an initiative such as the Kimberley Process for the sake of transparency and sustainability, it is essential that this issue be addressed. The diamond industry, which is one of the pillars of the Process, could take greater responsibility in this regard and could support the creation of a fund that would allow African NGOs to participate on an equal footing in all the meetings and events of the Process.

60. Noting that the Civil Society Coalition had decided not to attend the Kimberley Process meetings, owing to a number of concerns, the plenary expressed its desire for broad participation of the Coalition in the future. In that regard, the plenary agreed to further discuss the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund or similar mechanism that was acceptable to all participants and observers.

Other business

61. In addition to the delegations from the participants and observers of the Kimberley Process, the following delegates attended the meeting in the capacity of the guests of the Chair:

(a) Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic: Ruben De Koning, Expert (Natural Resources); and Simon Pascal Alain Handy, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic;

(b) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: Tyler Gillard, Legal Adviser and Project Head, Investment Division; and Dan Devlin, Senior Economist, Natural Resource Taxation;

(c) Placide Ngombe, President of the Organisation Centrafricaine pour le Developpement Durable;

(d) Regina Toguera, President of Mines Arts et Ressources Centrafricaines and member of the Kimberley Process follow-up committee of the Central African Republic in Berberati;

(e) Ruth Laoubai, Head of Programmes and Projects at the Association des Femmes Centrafricaines pour le Developpement Durable;

(f) Oladiran Bello, Executive Director of Good Governance Africa.

62. The plenary welcomed the decision of the Working Group on Monitoring to accept the Diamond Development Initiative as a Working Group member, consistent with the group's revised terms of reference.

63. The plenary took note of the annual report as presented by the World Diamond Council on its activities in support of implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and encouraged the Civil Society Coalition, the African Diamond Producers Association and the Diamond Development Initiative to also submit reports on their activities in support of implementation of the Scheme, in line with the 2009 administrative decision on the activities of observers.

64. The Kimberley Process Chair invited the Financial Action Task Force to participate in the intersessional and plenary meetings and the special forums; however, none of the representatives of that organization attended any of the events.

65. Nevertheless, according to the practice followed in previous years, the plenary agreed to engage with the Task Force by inviting the Kimberley Process working bodies to organize a discussion with the authors of their report related to risks associated with the supply chain of rough diamonds.

66. The plenary noted clause 10 of the administrative decision rules and criteria for selecting candidates for Vice-Chair of the Kimberley Process. The plenary welcomed the European Union as the new Kimberley Process Vice-Chair for 2017 and the Chair in 2018, and India as the incoming Vice-Chair for 2018 and the Chair in 2019.

67. The plenary welcomed Australia as the new Chair for 2017. The plenary recalled that host countries should facilitate entry formalities for those attending meetings of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. The plenary acknowledged that State sovereignty should be fully respected.

Enclosure

2016 Kimberley Process final communiqué

1. The fourteenth Kimberley Process plenary meeting was held from 13 to 17 November 2016 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. In addition to the delegations from the Process, participants and observers, representatives of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) attended as guests of the Chair.

2. The Committee on Participation and Chairmanship, the Committee on Rules and Procedures, the Working Group on Monitoring, the Working Group on Statistics, the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production, the Working Group of Diamond Experts and the monitoring team on the Central African Republic held meetings.

3. The plenary expressed its great appreciation for the Chair's active leadership of the Process, including through frequent travel, raising public awareness of the Process, demonstrating leadership on the Central African Republic and putting forth innovative proposals to strengthen the Process.

4. The plenary thanked the Chair for organizing the special forum, on the margins of the Kimberley Process meetings, as an informational session on synthetic diamonds and the issue of undisclosed synthetic diamonds.

5. The plenary recognized the efforts of and took note of the proposals made by the Chair to (a) develop a methodology on the valuation of rough diamonds, (b) establish a permanent secretariat for the Kimberley Process and (c) establish a Civil Society Coalition fund. The plenary looked forward to continued discussion of those proposals under the incoming Chair.

6. The plenary welcomed a proposal received from the Chair and aimed at strengthening the structure of the Process through the establishment of a Kimberley Process secretariat. Such a secretariat could support the continuity and efficiency of the Process. The plenary decided that the upcoming review cycle provided an opportunity to discuss means of improving the Process. The proposal stated that such a secretariat could potentially help facilitate progress in advancing the goals and objectives of the Process and, among other possibilities, for example, serve as a sustained presence maintaining contacts in countries of concern, support the Chair in interactions with government officials and other stakeholders, and assist the Process with regard to participants who had been suspended and were resuming participation in the Process. In that regard, the plenary looked forward to possible future ways to enhance cooperation with the United Nations system.

7. The plenary reaffirmed its commitment to the tripartite structure of the Process. Noting that the Civil Society Coalition had decided not to attend Process meetings in 2016 owing to a number of concerns, the plenary expressed its desire for broad participation by the Coalition in the future.

8. The plenary recognized the important work that civil society performed and expressed the intention to consider ways to support its robust participation. To that

end, the Process acknowledged the Chair's proposal to establish a multi-donor trust fund or similar mechanism acceptable to all participants and observers.

9. The plenary noted the progress made with regard to better understanding the challenges faced by some Process members in ensuring that their rough diamonds were valued appropriately. Undervaluation or overvaluation undermined the accuracy of the information on Process certificates.

10. The plenary expressed appreciation for the special forums on valuation hosted by the Chair, which had brought together a wide range of experts. The plenary took note of the draft study prepared by OECD on the challenges faced by some producing countries in valuation of rough diamonds, which might support those producing countries in their efforts to improve domestic resource mobilization from diamond production.

11. The plenary also thanked the Working Group of Diamond Experts subgroup on valuation for its work on mapping country approaches to valuation of rough diamonds, which provided a comprehensive reference for all Process members.

12. The plenary noted that ensuring that artisanal miners received fair value for their stones was a distinct but closely related issue that required attention in its own right. Any further work to improve valuation practices should be accessible and should also be designed to benefit artisanal miners.

13. The plenary noted that, for those countries seeking greater confidence that their rough diamonds were being valued accurately, a consistent methodology, building on comprehensive training and technical assistance for government officials, would be beneficial.

14. The plenary noted that, according to the Chair and some participants of the special forums, such a methodology might comprise several elements to be used by Process participants, including using standardized preparation and sorting protocols for rough diamonds in preparation for valuation, drawing on contemporary transacted prices for comparable rough diamonds as much as possible and, where that was not possible, potentially developing a methodology based on deriving the value of rough diamonds from contemporary transactions that was transparent in approach and objective, and that drew upon industry practices. The World Diamond Council, as an observer, reiterated that all current and future discussions must observe competition and antitrust law.

15. The plenary acknowledged that the following representatives of civil society organizations had attended the plenary meeting as guests of the Chair:

- Placide Ngombe, President of the Organisation Centrafricaine pour le Développement Durable
- Regina Toguera, President of Mines Arts et Ressources Centrafricaines and a member of the Kimberley Process follow-up committee of the Central African Republic in Berberati
- Ruth Laoubai, Head of Programmes and Projects at the Association des Femmes Centrafricaines pour le Développement Durable
- Oladiran Bello, Executive Director of Good Governance Africa.

16. The plenary noted the continued work of the scientific subgroup of the Working Group of Diamond Experts to improve the footprint of diamonds from the Central African Republic. Export shipment data for three months (May, July and September) had been scrutinized and added to the production footprint of that country. Those shipments had come from the compliant zone of the sub-prefecture of Berberati.

17. The plenary noted that, in order to improve the work on fingerprinting of diamonds from the Central African Republic (and Africa in general), the scientific subgroup had discussed the acquisition of a small representative parcel (minimum of 150 stones) from the extreme northern production zone of the Democratic Republic of the Congo bordering the Central African Republic, in conjunction with the Kimberley Process authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The aim of that exercise would be to scientifically differentiate between diamonds from the two countries.

18. Furthermore, the Working Group of Diamond Experts scientific subgroup had received a presentation by a scientific private company from the Russian Federation, on the application of fluorescent spectroscopy to analysing a diamond's individual fingerprint.

19. The plenary took note of the ongoing work of the Working Group of Diamond Experts subgroup on valuation in collecting responses to the valuation survey by participants, and that about 20 Kimberley Process participants had not yet completed their surveys. The plenary took note of the December 2016 deadline for completing the survey.

20. The Working Group of Diamond Experts subgroup on valuation intended to continue its work, consistent with its updated action plan. The plenary took note of discussions in the subgroup on valuation on the outcome and conclusions of the special forums of the Chair on valuation that had been held on the margins of the intersessional meetings in May in the United Arab Emirates, and in September in Antwerp, Belgium, and the current plenary in the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, the subgroup reported on the OECD consultation draft of observational details of the above-mentioned special forums of the Chair. On that basis, the plenary requested that the subgroup on valuation invite OECD to collaborate with the Kimberley Process to take that work forward, consistent with rules and procedures.

21. The plenary noted that, to continue and to expand the activities of the subgroup on valuation, the Working Group of Diamond Experts had revised its terms of reference and the 2015 action plan.

22. The plenary noted that the Working Group of Diamond Experts was finalizing a proposed revised administrative decision detailing the use of technical certificates for scientific purposes to replace administrative decision 01.13 regarding embargoed diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire.

23. The plenary noted the discussion in the Working Group of Diamond Experts on reviving the relationship between the Kimberley Process and the World Customs Organization and the subsequent work on reviewing harmonized system code-related classification issues.

24. The plenary noted the intention of the Working Group of Diamond Experts to update technical guidelines that were still applicable and other, older guidance texts to be addressed in the upcoming review process.

25. The plenary noted that the Working Group of Diamond Experts had provided an update to its members regarding the results of a survey of Kimberley Process participants on the disposition of confiscated rough diamonds.

26. The plenary endorsed the recommendation of the Working Group of Diamond Experts that the United Republic of Tanzania, a provisional member of the Working Group since 2015, become a member in the Working Group.

27. The plenary endorsed the recommendation of the Working Group of Diamond Experts to select the World Diamond Council as Chair and Namibia as the Vice-Chair of the Working Group.

28. The plenary noted that Mozambique had received an expert mission and that the draft report should be finished by the first quarter of 2017.

29. The plenary noted the approval by the Committee on Rules and Procedures of a version of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme core document that reflected the changes to the core document approved in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2013 under decision 1/2013, on modification of the core document of the Certification Scheme. Under that decision, the changes applied as at 1 January 2015. The plenary asked the Administrative Support Mechanism to publish it on the official Process website for informational purposes.

30. The plenary noted the decision of the Committee on Rules and Procedures to continue work on a document entitled "Practical Kimberley Process guidance: how to conduct surveys of Kimberley Process participants and observers".

31. The plenary noted the work of the Committee on Rules and Procedures concerning the engagement of the Kimberley Process with external organizations and the Committee's expectation that there would be further discussions on that issue.

32. The plenary encouraged the Committee to consider updating the administrative decision relating to the chairmanship of Kimberley Process working bodies.

33. The plenary noted that the Committee on Rules and Procedures was continuing discussions on the selection of the Committee Chair.

34. The plenary welcomed China as Vice-Chair of the Committee.

35. The plenary welcomed the resumption of participation in the Kimberley Process by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

36. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had committed to hosting a review visit no later than six months after the resumption of exports, in which Ukraine would be invited to participate. In that regard, the plenary noted the express commitment and interest of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with regard to hosting a review visit and welcomed the participation of Ukraine in the review visit.

37. The plenary acknowledged the presentation in the Committee on Participation and Chairmanship on the implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Gabon. The plenary encouraged Gabon to invite an expert mission before

the 2017 intersessional meeting in order to begin its process of admission to the Process.

38. The plenary approved the United Arab Emirates becoming the Chair of the Committee on Participation and Chairmanship.

39. The plenary noted the application of the World Jewellery Confederation for observer status, which had been discussed during the meeting of the Committee on Participation and Chairmanship. Currently, it had been concluded that the admission of the Confederation as an independent observer would not be accepted.

40. The plenary welcomed the update provided by the Working Group on Monitoring on the state of implementation of its rolling work programme for 2016, which included both recurrent activities designed to implement the revised administrative decision on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme peer review system and actions to follow up on relevant conclusions from the 2015 plenary that had been held in Luanda under the chairmanship of Angola.

41. The plenary welcomed the decision of the Working Group on Monitoring to select South Africa as its incoming Chair and Botswana as its incoming Vice-Chair. In that context, the plenary acknowledged the leadership shown by the European Union in effectively chairing the Working Group over the past 13 years and supported the decision of the Working Group that the European Union, as its outgoing Chair, would hand over its role and duties to South Africa as the incoming Chair within a period of three months from January 2017, to ensure a smooth and seamless transition.

42. The plenary welcomed the decision of the Working Group on Monitoring to accept the Diamond Development Initiative as a member, consistent with the Working Group's revised terms of reference.

43. The plenary took note of the results of the 2016 annual reporting exercise, as the main comprehensive and regular source of information on implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme by participants, and welcomed the submission of annual reports on implementation of the Scheme in 2015 by 52 participants representing 79 countries. The plenary noted that the Working Group on Monitoring had requested the Committee on Participation and Chairmanship to deal with the one case of late submission (Panama). The plenary had reviewed the assessment of annual reports and encouraged participants to continue submitting substantive annual reports on national implementation of the Scheme.

44. The plenary took note of the annual report as presented by the World Diamond Council on its activities in support of implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and encouraged the Civil Society Coalition, the African Diamond Producers Association and the Diamond Development Initiative to submit reports on their activities in support of implementation of the Scheme as well, in line with the 2009 administrative decision on the activities of observers.

45. The plenary took note of reports on the review visits conducted in Armenia, Belarus, the Congo, Lesotho and the United Republic of Tanzania, and invited those five participants to report back on implementation of the recommendations at the next intersessional meeting, in line with the revised administrative decision on a peer review system. The plenary also took note of reports on the preliminary

findings and observations on the review visits conducted in the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and the European Union, and requested the respective review visit and review mission teams to finalize their reports before the end of the year.

46. Furthermore, the plenary took note of implementation of the recommendations from review visit reports by Mexico and Swaziland, and requested those two participants to reflect that follow-up in their next annual reports.

47. The plenary welcomed the expressions of interest in hosting a review visit from Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Ghana, India, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mauritius, Namibia, Norway, Panama and Togo. The plenary welcomed the commitment made by those countries to continually open their certification systems to review and improvements, and called upon other participants to continue inviting review visits under the Kimberley Process peer review system.

48. The plenary took note of the continued discussions by the Working Group on Monitoring on the guidance note on the organization and conduct of review visits, as prepared on the basis of contributions and best practice examples shared by a number of members of the Working Group who had served as team leaders of review visits. The plenary considered the new guidance note an important practical tool enabling both review visit team members and host participants to prepare optimally for the successful conduct of review visits, and invited the Working Group to explore ways in which those guidelines could be reflected in future revisions to the administrative decision on the peer review system.

49. The plenary welcomed a proposal from the Working Group on Monitoring to encourage Kimberley Process participants to reinforce its follow-up with Process authorities and explore ways to enhance access to information as regards fraudulent Process certificates through a dedicated area on the Process website.

50. The plenary acknowledged the progress made by the Central African Republic with regard to implementation of the administrative decision and operational framework for the resumption of exports of rough diamonds from that country, and welcomed the decisions of the Kimberley Process monitoring team to declare the sub-prefectures of Berbérati, Boda, Carnot and Nola "compliant zones". The plenary encouraged the Process authorities of the Central African Republic to continue implementing both the administrative decision and the recommendations from the report of the Process monitoring team on its field missions to Berberati, Boda, Carnot, Gadzi and Nola in March and August 2016, and to continue implementing enhanced vigilance measures and ensure the traceability of rough diamonds from all four "compliant zones". The plenary invited the Process monitoring team to continue ensuring a smooth inspection process as regards proposed export shipments as per its term of reference, and further support the Process authorities of the Central African Republic in carrying out the envisaged forensic audit of the stockpiles. The plenary took note of a recommendation from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established by the Security Council in its resolution 2127 (2013), whose mandate had been extended by the Council in its resolution 2262 (2016), to the tripartite follow-up committee of the Central African Republic and the Process monitoring team to ensure continued monitoring of the freedom of movement in all compliant zones, consistent with proposed benchmarks.

51. The plenary noted that the Working Group of Diamond Experts representative on the Central African Republic monitoring team had briefed working group members on the monitoring team's work over the past months. With regard to the role of the Working Group of Diamond Experts in the monitoring team, four proposed shipments had been assessed by the diamond expert team. Three of those shipments had been approved for export. The plenary noted that the Working Group had decided to form a second diamond expert team to account for an expected increase in exports from compliant zones in the Central African Republic.

52. The plenary noted that the Central African Republic monitoring team had developed a document on terms of reference which was intended to facilitate a forensic audit of the pre- and post-suspension rough diamond stockpiles in Bangui before any part of the current stockpiles was exported, consistent with its responsibility set forth in the operational framework of the 2015 administrative decision on the Central African Republic.

53. In that context, the plenary welcomed the resumption of the development assistance project of the United States of America in the Central African Republic with a view to enhancing the capacity of that country and assisting it with the implementation of the administrative decision and operational framework for the resumption of exports of rough diamonds, and encouraged other participants and observers to consider providing complementary technical assistance.

54. The plenary welcomed the initiative taken by the Central African Republic and its neighbouring Kimberley Process participants (Cameroon, the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) to ensure cooperation on Kimberley Process Certification Scheme compliance issues with a regional dimension; and encouraged the Central African Republic and the Process monitoring team to continue working closely together with relevant United Nations actors, notably the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, as well as the international community.

55. The plenary took note of further steps taken by the Mano River Union countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) to implement the regional approach initiative as highlighted by the Security Council in its resolution 2153 (2014), in which the Council lifted the embargo on the export of rough diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire. The plenary welcomed the continual support to the Mano River Union countries provided by the Working Group on Monitoring technical team and the "Friends of the Mano River Union" group, in particular ongoing efforts to formalize the role of the Mano River Union secretariat and involve other implementing partners and or technical assistance providers.

56. In that context, the plenary also took note of an update provided by the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development project, co-funded by the United States and the European Union, and a presentation made by the European Union on its ongoing and planned development assistance in support of the Mano River Union regional approach. The plenary encouraged all participants and observers to continue working closely with the Mano River Union countries and continue addressing their technical assistance needs.

57. The plenary noted that the Diamond Development Initiative had briefed members of the Working Group on Monitoring and the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production on the implementation of its miners' registration programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including on statistics and on findings relevant to the Kimberley Process.

58. The plenary agreed to engage with the Financial Action Task Force by inviting the Kimberley Process working bodies to organize a discussion with the authors of their report related to risks associated with the supply chain of rough diamonds.

59. The plenary noted the completion by the Working Group on Statistics of 37 participant statistical analyses for 2015. There remained 17 analyses to be completed.

60. The plenary noted that the following Kimberley Process participants had incomplete or missing statistical data on the Process rough diamond statistics website:

2015

- Mexico (Q4 certificate count)

2016

- Bangladesh (Q2 trade and certificate count)
- Brazil (H1 production)
- Indonesia (H1 production)
- Mexico (Q2 trade and certificate count)
- Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) (H1 production)

61. The plenary noted the request of the Working Group on Statistics that the Committee on Participation and Chairmanship take action consistent with the November 2005 guidelines with respect to the non-submission of statistics. That approach included measures concerning participants who failed to submit their statistical reports consistent with annex III to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme document.

62. The plenary noted that the Working Group on Statistics had initiated a fourth iteration of the annual data anomaly questionnaire process, which was used to identify anomalies and discrepancies in reported Kimberley Process statistics. The Working Group had developed, reviewed and analysed the questionnaire tables for Process participants identified as having significant anomalies in their reported data. Those participants should receive a questionnaire in the near future based on their anomalies and consistent with the 2012 administrative decision on the data anomaly questionnaire process. The Working Group expected to review the questionnaire process with regard to the feasibility of that tool by the next intersessional meeting.

63. The plenary noted the adoption by the Working Group on Statistics of a template for automated charts and tables that Working Group members intended to use in the preparation of the annual statistical analyses. The automation of the reports was expected to reduce the amount of time that members spent on the

development of the annual statistical analyses and to reduce the burden on members in preparing them.

68. The plenary acknowledged the work of the Working Group on Statistics to develop a reconciliation survey that could be used by the Working Group to develop guidelines for the reconciliation of statistical data. The plenary looked forward to the Working Group's continued work on the survey.

69. The plenary noted the support that the Working Group on Statistics had given to the Central African Republic monitoring team and the joint session it had held with the Working Group on Monitoring and the Working Group of Diamond Experts on the status of and way forward on the Central African Republic.

66. The plenary noted the presentation given to the Working Group on Statistics by the office of the Chair on blockchain technology within the Kimberley Process. The Working Group welcomed further discussions on the study of blockchain technology within the framework of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

67. The plenary noted that the Working Group on Statistics was continuing discussions on the selection of its Chair.

68. The plenary welcomed India as the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Statistics.

69. The plenary noted that participants of the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production continued engaging to align and integrate within their national and regional development action plans regarding the mining sector, the effective implementation of the recommendations contained in the Moscow Declaration on Improving Internal Controls over Alluvial Diamond Production and the Washington Declaration on Integrating Development of Artisanal and Small-Scale Diamond Mining with Kimberley Process Implementation.

70. The plenary acknowledged the effort made by the countries of the Mano River Union, and other initiatives and agencies, as well as the Diamond Development Initiative, the United States and the European Union, to provide the capacity and resources necessary to effectively drive the implementation of the Moscow and Washington Declarations.

71. The plenary welcomed the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production.

72. The plenary noted and endorsed the concerns identified by participants of the Working Group regarding the lack of geological surveys in their respective countries. Such studies would help determine viable areas for artisanal mining, the expected volume of production and the expected number of years that the diamond deposits would last. Participants of the Working Group called upon other Kimberley Process participants and potential donors to provide the technical assistance necessary for geological surveys. The plenary also noted that participants of the Working Group supported the development of policies relating to data management in their respective countries.

73. The plenary welcomed the implementation of administrative decision 04/2013, relating to the chairmanship of Kimberley Process working bodies, as adopted at the

plenary in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2013. Furthermore, the plenary encouraged the continued application of that administrative decision.

74. The plenary welcomed Australia as the new Chair for 2017. The plenary recalled that host countries should facilitate entry formalities for those attending Kimberley Process Certification Scheme meetings. The plenary acknowledged that State sovereignty should be fully respected.

75. The plenary approved the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production in 2017 and the Chair in 2018.

76. The plenary noted clause 10 of the administrative decision on rules and criteria for selecting candidates for Vice-Chair of the Kimberley Process. The plenary welcomed the European Union as the new Kimberley Process Vice-Chair for 2017 and the Chair in 2018, and India as the incoming Vice-Chair for 2018 and the Chair in 2019.